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Abstract
In this Article, Judge Sergio García Ramírez of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights explores the complex and often vexing relationship be-
tween the Inter-American Human Rights system and the domestic human
rights protections within the system’s member states. García Ramírez iden-
tifies a number of challenges to implementing human rights protections in
Latin America, many of which are rooted in a history of authoritarianism
in the twentieth century and the nascent nature of the region’s democratic
institutions. Yet he sees solutions in the role of the Inter-American Court in
† This Article was prepared for the Meeting of Experts on the Inter-American Human Rights
System convened by the Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of Notre Dame, Indiana,
United States of America, March 31–April 2, 2014.
‡ Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Investigator, Institute of Jurdical Investiga-
tions, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [National Autonomous University of Mexico];
Professor, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
This Article was prepared with the collaboration of Eréndira Nohemí Ramos Vázquez, Research
Assistant (SNI).
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the region. García Ramírez highlights the Court’s role in interpreting inter-
national human rights laws for the region and the increasing role of national
judges in integrating these rights into national systems. Thus, with this body
of law as a baseline, he believes that through careful legal and political dia-
logue and a greater exercise of conventionality control, among other steps,
the domestic and international human rights regimes in the region can work
together to ensure greater respect for and protections of individual persons.
I Introduction
This work seeks to present a brief overview of the relationship between states—
and, more broadly, national systems of protection of human rights—and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court). This implies examining the
work of an international or supranational jurisdiction which has been called
upon to render justiciable “decisions and transformations” of great importance,1
that have opened the way forward, overcoming innumerable obstacles during
recent decades.2
What is involved is a relatively recent experience, and of course a tentative
one. It remains far—but ever less so, viewed historically—from firmly taking root
and yielding the results proponents hoped for when the system was founded,3
with the adoption of the Pact of San José in the Conference of 1969,4 and the
installation of the Court.5
This topic, which today stimulates expectations and actions among the states
of the Latin American subcontinent (participants in a sort of “judicial space”
defined in 19996 and reduced in 20137) is of course closely related to the condi-
tions of the subcontinent—country by country, and collectively—and with the
1 I refer to the name of a recent work in which I have examined this issue, in respect to my
country. See Sergio García Ramírez & Maricio del Toro Huerta, México ante la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Mexico before the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights] (2011).
2 “During its first 30 years of operation in a particularly unsuitable context . . . the Inter-
American Human Rights System, even with all the limitations [it faced] reached a level of develop-
ment that few could have anticipated.” Felipe González Morales, Sistema interamericano de
derechos humanos [The Inter-American System of Human Rights] 58, 290–91, 457 (2013).
3 See Carlos García Bauer, Los derechos Humanos: Preocupación universal [Human
Rights: Universal Concerns] 113 (1960).
4 See Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, Actas y documentos [Records
and Documents], 349–51, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.K./XVI/1.2 (1969), http://www.oas.org/es/
cidh/docs/enlaces/Conferencia%20Interamericana.pdf.
5 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos.Memoria de Instalación [Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Proceedings of
Installation] (2d ed. 1999), http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/libro.htm?l=2185.
6 Barbados was the last state that accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, on June
4, 2000. On the other hand, Dominica was the last state that ratified the American Convention
on Human Rights on June 11, 1993. See Signatories and Ratifications of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Dep’t of Int’l L., http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_
Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited June 25, 2015).
7 Venezuela deposited its complaint against the ACHR on September 10, 2012 before the Sec-
retary General of the Organization of American States; the denunciation took effect the following
year. Actually, twenty states recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. See id.
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panorama of such conditions at the time of the formal establishment of the Inter-
American system of protection of human rights as well as in our own time. It is
worth observing, of course, in order to apply the observation to the topics ad-
dressed in this Article—and with special emphasis on the understanding of what
I shall call below the “American voyage”—that this region has a great deal of
heterogeneity, reflected in the expression “the Americas,” which suggests a dif-
ferent reality than that found in the concept of “America.” The totality of states
and peoples of the American continent and nearby islands consists of profoundly
different sub-regions, each of which presents its own profile with respect to reg-
ulation and protection of human rights. It is necessary, then, to revert to the ex-
istence of “borders” within “the Americas,” which define separate and diverse
historical, demographic, and cultural conditions, as well as political, economic
and social characteristics, which lead to variations among the national systems
of human rights protection and their relations with the Inter-American system.8
II The Course of Democracy
The development of the relations between the Inter-American tribunal—and
even more the system9—and the states of the Americas has run through a haz-
ardous, gradually widening course: the course of democracy, a right of the Amer-
ican peoples, implicit or explicit in their national constitutions, and only recently
recognized in a regional instrument,10 that would have seemed impractical only
a few years ago and pursuant to which it is now possible to consider collective
8 There are significant differences, even in the midst of the “same America.” Such is the case
in the Caribbean, which coincides geographically (though not completely; take into account the
case of Suriname, a continental country). States possess diverse national ascendancy and distinct
juridical traditions: English, French, Spanish, and Dutch, in addition to the African component of
the population of several republics of the Caribbean. In respect to the northern states, the possibility
that the United States would join the group of states party to the ACHR seems very remote (although
it would be very convenient) (there have been suggested midrange alternatives, such as having the
country provide advisory opinions. See Mark Kirk, Should the United States Ratify the American
Convention on Human Rights?, Rev. IIDH, July–Dec. 1991, at 65, 86–89. A less distant option
could be the approach of Canada. See Staff of Standing S. Comm. on Hum. Rts., Enhancing
Canada’s Role in the OAS: Canadian Adherence to the American Convention on Human
Rights 58 (Comm. Print 2003), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/372/huma/
rep/rep04may03-e.pdf.
9 It is necessary to fully understand the system, which encompasses much more than the inter-
national monitoring bodies, and understand, in a real sense, the states, OAS, civil society (and its
institutions), and emerging actors (journalists, various professions, academia, Ombudsman, pub-
lic defenders). See Sergio García Ramírez, La Corte Interamericana de Derecho Humanos
[The Inter-American Court of Human Rights] 38–42 (2007). Within this framework, the po-
litical mission of the OAS is essential and unfolds in various acts. It has failed to recognize the
Inter-American Court as an organ of the OAS. On this subject, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-
American Court, and the OAS, 7 Hum. Rts. L.J. 157, 162–64 (1986).
10 See O.A.S. G.A. Res. 1 (XXVIII), Inter-American Democratic Charter (Sept. 11, 2001).
Adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States on September 11, 2001
(the same date as the tragic terrorist attacks in Washington and New York), its preamble reaffirms
“the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a demo-
cratic society,” and reiterates that “democracy is indispensable for the stability, peace, and develop-
ment of the region.” Id. pmbl.
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actions in defense of democracy,11 a controversial topic. These relations now
advance, stand still, or retreat in accordance with actions taken by democratic
nations.12
In general, the American constitutions embody the ideals of democracy and
fundamental rights.13 These are central facts of their purpose, their history, and
their discourse, but not necessarily of their experience. Some time ago, an illus-
trious Italian jurist, in my country for a course on procedure and democracy,
referred to this distance—which seemed irreducible—between the reality and
the constitutional ideal: What is important is not so much the solemn letter of
the fundamental law, but the democratic customs that serve as its cement and
guarantee.14
The gap between the democratic proclamations of our fundamental laws and
the chronic practice of the exercise of power is not, to be sure, the only serious
obstacle to the effective enjoyment of human rights. To this gap, it is necessary
to add another, no less profound and deep-rooted: that imposed by poverty—
and its consequences and scarcities—on an enormous number of people in Latin
America. The real enjoyment of human rights—not only economic, social, and
cultural, but also, of course, civil and political—is unthinkable where the sup-
posed bearers of these rights lack the conditions of life that permit, not to say
favor, the true realization of their rights and liberties.15
Latin American constitutions fall within the category that is called “nominal”
11 Relating to this question, see Pedro Nikken, Análisis de las definiciones conceptuales básicas
para la aplicación de los mecanismos de defensa colectiva de la democracia previstos en la Carta
Democrática Interamericana [Analysis of Basic Conceptual Definitions for the Application of Col-
lective Defense Mechanisms of Democracy Under the Inter-American Democratic Charter], Rev.
IIDH, Jan.–June 2006, at 13.
12 See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Democracia y derechos humanos: el régimen emer-
gente en la promoción internacional de la democracia y del Estado de Derecho [Democracy and
Human Rights: The Emerging Regime in the International Promotion of Democracy and the Rule of
Law], in La Corte y el Sistema Interamericanos de Derechos Humanos [The Court and the
Inter-American Human Rights System] 515 (Rafael Nieto Navía ed., 1994); see also González
Morales, supra note 2, at 457; Manuel Becerra Ramírez, El control de la aplicación del
derecho internacional [Control of the Operation of International Law] 122 (Instituto
de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Estudios Jurídicos Ser. No. 234, 2013).
13 In this sense our constitutions respond to what has been called the “constitutional State with a
common European and Atlantic mark.” Peter Häberle, El Estado Constitucional [The Con-
stitutional State] 3 (2001). See also Antonio Colomer Viadel, Introducción al constitu-
cionalismo iberoamericano [Introduction to Spanish-American Constitutionalism] 102–
03 (1990).
14 See Piero Calamandrei, Proceso y Democracia [Procedure and Democracy] 56 (Héc-
tor Fix-Zamudio trans., Jurídicas Europa-América 1960) (1954).
15 The relationship between poverty and human rights provides unique characteristics to the
countries of our America and promotes reflections oriented through an effective assessment of
state human rights protection in the region, beyond statements about substantive democracy
and social justice. See Pedro Nikken, La pobreza en la perspectiva de los derechos humanos
y la democracia [Poverty in Terms of Human Rights and Democracy], in ¿Quién responde
por los derechos humanos de las poblaciones mas pobres en América Latina y El
Caribe? [Who is Responsible for the Human Rights of the Poorest Populations in Latin
America and the Carribbean?] 204–07 (Gerardo Caetano & Roberto Cuéllar Martínez eds.,
2012), http://iidh-webserver.iidh.ed.cr/multic/UserFiles/Biblioteca/IIDH/12_2012/
5d289ec3-6c92-4f47-b5c2-fa036d212549.pdf.
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or “semantic,”16 more discursive than normative. This reality reflects an old
colonial saying, common to the nations of “our America” of José Martí:17 The
orders of the Crown are respected, but not carried out.18 Thus was incubated
a dual reality—and a dual legitimacy and legality—from which we have yet to
liberate ourselves.
III The “American Voyage”
In writing on this and related topics, I have used a nautical image that strikes me
as useful to describe the process of human rights and its instruments of protection
in this region. In my view, the nations of the Americas—and I focus, of course,
on those of Latin, Ibero, or Hispanic America—have made and are making their
own voyage into the wind,19 from a certain point of departure,20 toward the
common destiny sought by humanity: the arrival port that implies the definitive
reign—not merely discursive, but in practice—of human rights.
This voyage is not identical to the one undertaken by humanity as a whole
(although the American voyage develops in that context and travels in the same
direction), nor is it the same as that taken by Europe in the Convention of 1950
in response to the experiences of the Second World War;21 nor is it identical—
16 See Karl Loewenstein, Teoría de la Constitución [Theory of the Constitution] 218
(Alfredo Gallego Anabitarte & Ariel Barcelona trans., Ariel 1976) (1959). About this characteris-
tic of Latin American constitutions, see Humberto Quiroga Lavié, Derecho constitucional
latinoamericano [Latin American Constitutional Law] 17–19 (1991).
17 See José Martí, La Conferencia Monetaria de las Republicas de America, La Rev. Ilustrada,
Jan. 10, 1891, reprinted in José Martí, 6 Obras Completas [Complete Works] 157 (2d ed.
1992); José Martí, Nuestra América, El Partido Liberal, Jan. 30, 1891, reprinted in José Martí,
Obras Completas, supra, at 15.
18 See JoséMaría Ots y Capdequí, Historia del derecho español en América y del dere-
cho indiano [The History of Spanish Law in America and Indian Law] 89 (1969).
19 See Sergio García Ramírez, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ante la pena de
muerte [The Inter-American Court of Human Rights before the Death Penalty], in Por la Aboli-
ción Universal de la Pena de Muerte [For the Universal Abolition of the Death Penalty]
215, 229 (Antonio Muñoz Aunión et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter García Ramírez, La Corte In-
teramericana]; Sergio García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I [Judicial
Control of Conventionality I] (Poder Judicial del Estado de Aguascalientes, Monografías Ser.
No. 50, 2012); Sergio García Ramírez, El control judicial interno de convencionalidad [The Con-
ventional Internal Control Court], 5 Rev. IUS 123 (2011); Sergio García Ramírez, La ‘Navegación
Americana’ de los derechos humanos: hacia un ius commune [The “American Navigation” of Hu-
man Rights: Towards an Ius Commune], in Ius constitutionale commune en América Latina [Ius
Constitutionale Commune in Latin America] 459 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2014) [here-
inafter García Ramírez, La Navegación Americana].
20 Of course, I do not refer to the “long march” of the Americas in the struggle between author-
itarianism that has prevailed since ancient times—it is a constant of American life—and the current
rising of human rights. I have alluded to this in Sergio García Ramírez, Los derechos humanos
y la jurisdicción interamericana [Human Rights and the Inter-American Jurisdiction] 5
(2002). Relating to this material is an illustrative reflection in Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to
Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 Hum. Rts.
Q. 281 (2003).
21 There has been a frequent comparison between the European and American experiences.
See Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Reflexiones sobre la Corte Europea e interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos [Reflections on the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights], in Similitudes
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although there are points of similarity—to that which has been carried out with
enormous effort in Africa.22 Each voyage reflects particularities that identify it
and mark its rhythm. Each has its own chronology and movements, character-
istic “style,” and must overcome its own particular obstacles.23 Each adjusts,
then, to the conditions of the region in which it navigates. It is linked to its
circumstances in “Ortega-like” fashion.24
It is essential to understand—not to praise or denigrate—this specificity in
assessing the American voyage, to understand its course and to advance it ef-
fectively, just as it is essential to understand—even though at times we may be
disconcerted—certain characteristic facts of other voyages, quite important for
them but still distant for us, or even—from our own perspective—very disqui-
eting and risky, such as the margin of appreciation in the European system.25
y divergencias entre los sistemas de protección regional de los derechos humanos
[Similarities and Differences between Regional Systems of Human Rights Protection]
99, 99–131; El Diálogo entre los Sistemas Europeo y Americano de Derechos Humanos
(Javier García Roca et al. eds., 2012); see also International Protection of Human Rights
(Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1973).
22 The African system is based on the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights,
adopted by fifty-three states in 1981. In addition to the African Commission on Human Rights,
there exists a Court established by protocol in 1998, entered into force in 2004; the tribunal has
been operational since 2006. Today, the two jurisdictions have joined together in a single body: the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights. SeeYuria Saavedra Álvarez, El sistema africano de dere-
chos humanos y de los pueblos. Prolegómenos [The African System of Human and Peoples’ Rights:
Prologue], 8 Anuario Mexicano de Der. Internacional [Mexican Y.B. Int’l L.] (Instituto de
Investigaciones Jurídicas) 671 (2008); José H. Fischel de Andrade, El sistema africano de protección
de los derechos humanos y de los pueblos: Primera parte [The African System of Protection of Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights: Part I], in 6 Estudios básicos de derechos humanos [Basic Studies
in Human Rights] 447 (1999).
23 The answer as to the overall success of the Court in the performance of its duties “depends on
the political climate of the Americas and the attitude of the American governments towards human
rights in general.” Thomas Buergenthal, Robert E. Norris & Dinah Shelton, La protección
de los derechos humanos en las Américas [The Protection of Human Rights in the Amer-
icas] 55 (1990).
24 Regarding the influence, ideas and democratic expressions, with different manifestations, in
the European and American systems, see Amaya Úbeda de Torres, Democracia y derechos
humanos en Europa y en América [Democracy and Human Rights in Europe and America]
(2006).
25 See Javier García Roca, El margen de apreciación nacional en la interpretación del
Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos [The National Margin of Appreciation in the
Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights] (2010); Giuseppe de Ver-
gottini, Más allá del diálogo entre tribunales [Beyond Dialogue between Tribunals]
110–11 (Pedro J. Tenorio Sánchez trans., Civitas 2011) (2010); see alsoMierielle Delmas-Marty,
Le Pluralisme Ordonné [The Orderly Pluralism] 75 (2006) (arguing that this national margin
is the “master key” of “orderly pluralism”); Robert Blackburn, The Institutions and Processes of
the Convention, in Fundamental Rights in Europe 3, 24 (Robert Blackburn & Jörg Polakiewicz
eds., 2001); Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, El Sistema Interamericano de Proteción de los
Derechos Humanos [The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights]
62 (3d ed. 2004). It has been said that the unrestricted application of this figure “could cause the
same human right to not have the same depth or reach in all places, but different forms and in-
tensities, a circumstance that would affect the universality of the law and authorize its unequal
interpretation.” Néstor Sagüés, La interpretación judicial de la constitución: De la con-
stitución nacional a la Constitución convencionalizada [Judicial Interpretation of the
Constitution: From the National Constitution to the Conventionalized Constitution]
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It is evident that the American context has shaped the structures and offices of
the Inter-American Commission and Court. Its influence is found in the origin
of their limitations and their possibilities; in the “reasons” or lack thereof for
their membership (which has often been questioned, although there do not seem
to be “antiseptic” solutions, and which today, in addition, suffers from an ab-
sence of women judges, despite the fact that recently there were three women
judges on the Court, including the President);26 in the scarcity of their mate-
rial resources,27 which it has been necessary to complement—from a surprising
“source of provisioning”—with resources from other nations, distant (in more
than one sense) from the American nations;28 in debates over the force of the res-
olutions emitted by the international organs of the system;29 in the novel nature
of the reparation measures decreed by the Commission and the Court, which
are rooted in the “social” ideas of the foundational instruments;30 in the “in-
stitutional role” of the Inter-American Court, to which I will refer again below,
and in the “itinerant” effort the Court has undertaken in order to “nationalize
itself” in each of the countries over which it exercises contentious jurisdiction.31
338 (2013).
26 In this area, there was a long-time issue of judges and of national judges who appeared in
contentious proceedings. On this subject, see the criticism Faundez formulated about the figure of
ad-hoc judges within the jurisdiction of human rights. Héctor Faúndez Ledesma, La Composición de
la Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos [The Composition of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights], Rev. de Der. Público [Rev. Pub. L.], Jan.–June 1994, at 25, 29 (Venez.). The
Inter-American Court modified its traditional interpretation of Article 55 of the ACHR, under the
terms of Advisory Opinion OC-20/09. Article 55 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-20/09, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) no. 20 (Sept. 29, 2009). Under this opinion,
the figure of the ad hoc judge remained excluded.
27 The actual position of the Inter-American Court on budget matters contrasts starkly with the
numerous official recommendations on improving the resources of the Tribunal, taking into account
that “the promotion and protection of human rights constitutes a fundamental priority for the Or-
ganization [of American States].” O.A.S. G.A. Res. 1827 (XXXI), ¶ 6 (June 5, 2001).
28 This is the case of contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, the Spanish
Agency for International Cooperation, and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark. In fact,
the first effective contributions to finance the Inter-American public defense came from the Norwe-
gian government. See Aportes y donaciones [Contributions and Donations], Inter-Am. Ct. Hum.
Rts., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/es/al-dia/aportes-donaciones (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015).
29 García Ramírez, La Navegación Americana, supra note 19, at 489.
30 The preamble to the ACHR includes the reaffirmation of American states to “consolidate in
this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and
social justice based on respect for the fundamental rights of man.” American Convention on Human
Rights, pmbl., Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (emphasis added).
Asdrúbal Aguiar refers to the ideal of social democracy pursued by the Inter-American system, and
adds: “Join the 631 teachings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, taken from the most
relevant advisory opinions and contentious judgments, that show democracy in its strength, and how
it is not only a political regimen but, above all, a form of social life and an individual state of mind.”
Asdrúbal Aguiar, La democracia en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos 1987–2012 [Democracy in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 1987–2012], at 11 (2012), http://www.infojus.gob.ar/descarga-
archivo?guid=/lmnoprst-uvwd-octr-inac-f130344f1pdf&name=CF130344F1.PDF.
31 See Pablo Saavedra Alessandri & Gabriela Pacheco Arias, Las sesiones “itinerantes” de la
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Un largo y fecundo caminar por América [The “Itiner-
ant” Sessions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Long and FruitfulWalk for America],
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All this enters into the sum of the ups and downs, vicissitudes, advances, and
setbacks of the American voyage, as well as into the complex relations between
the international organs (especially the Court) and the national systems.32
At the outset, the creation and functioning of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights encountered severe obstacles in many countries of the region
with respect to the effective enjoyment of human rights,33 given the dominant
ideas about sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction.34 This problem, present on
the international scene, was especially serious in the context of Latin American
nations, where it was necessary to wage and to win—to a growing but not abso-
lute degree—the battle for universal respect of human rights and their effective
guarantees. In the relationship between the Court and the states, telltale markers
of the old debate are often seen.35 Such markers are also seen in the variety of
positions taken in the capitals of states, none of which are monolithic.36 The
diversity of forces contending inside each state has made possible the progress
of democracy and human rights and continues to favor their advance in the face
of opposing currents, which often “hold the steering wheel” of government.
Finally, an extremely important development has been strengthened and consol-
idated in the Inter-American system, namely the conviction that the subject of
human rights belongs properly to the international sphere and is not reserved to
domestic jurisdiction.37
The story of the vicissitudes of the Inter-American jurisdiction cannot prop-
erly be told without mentioning the moments of “crisis,” more or less intense,
which the Court has had to confront and which have generated obstacles of
considerable importance. Among them are the chronic insufficiency of resources
from their natural source (the OAS), the conflicts with states culminating in their
in Recepción nacional del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos y admisión
de la competencia contenciosa de la Corte Interamericana [National Reception of the
International Human Rights Law and Admission of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court] 37 (Sergio García Ramírez & Mireya Castañeda Hernández eds., 2009).
32 Faúndez Ledesma describes the problems and limitations of the system and refers to the ob-
stacles that foster an insufficient will on behalf of the states as to an effective respect for human
rights. However, he also concludes that the system offers an “encouraging balance.” See Faúndez
Ledesma, supra note 25, at 1007.
33 See Thomas Buergenthal, Recordando los inicios de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Hu-
manos [Recalling the Beginnings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], Rev. IIDH, Jan.–
June 2004, at 11; see also González Morales, supra note 2, at 43–44.
34 See García Bauer, supra note 3, at 297. Today, the issue of human rights is part of the catalog
of the “globalized areas” inwhich appear “shared sovereignties.” See alsoManuel Becerra Ramírez et
al., La soberanía en la era de la globalización [Sovereignty in the Era of Globalization], in Soberanía
y juridificatión de las relaciones internacionales [Sovereignty and the Juridification
of International Relations] 66 (Manuel Becerra Ramírez &Klaus TheodorMüeller Uhlenbrock
eds., 2010).
35 See Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 244, ¶ 7 (June 26, 2012).
36 See Sergio García Ramírez & Marcela Benavides Hernández, Reparaciones por vio-
lación de derechos humanos (2014).
37 SeeClaudio Grossman,Reflexiones sobre el sistema interamericano de protección y promoción
de los derechos humanos [Reflections on the Inter-American System for the Protection and Promo-
tion of Human Rights], in La Corte y el Sistema Interamericanos de Derechos Humanos,
supra note 12, at 245, 254–55.
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unilateral withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the Court, after which the Court
fortunately and energetically rejected this approach and found a reasonable so-
lution38—the denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights by
certain states, to which I will refer below; and the recent tensions in the seat
of the Inter-American system during a process of review.39 The Court itself has
suggested and undertaken processes of review, such as that which culminated
in its current regulation.40 In academic doctrine, there are arguments that it “is
timely and useful to pause in the road and substantially review the Court.”41
IV Some Actors in the System: Civil Society and Emerging Actors
In bringing and examining contentious cases before the Inter-American Court,
and also in promoting and analyzing advisory opinions, civil society has played
a role of prime importance. Without the presence of organizations of this “third
sector,” the Inter-American system would not have achieved the degree of de-
38 Among the “crises” of the system, which impacted or still impact the work of the Commission
and the Court, was the appearance that Peru would purportedly withdraw from the jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court without denouncing the Convention. On the removal and return of
Peru to the jurisidiction of the Court, see César Landa Arroyo, Tribunal Constitucional y Es-
tada Democrático [The Constitutional Tribunal and the Democratic State] 867 (3d ed.,
2007); Sergio García Ramírez, Una controversia sobre la competencia de la Corte Interamer-
icana de Derechos Humanos [A Controversy on the Competence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights], in Estudios jurídicos [Legal Studies] 389 (2000); Sergio García Ramírez,
La jurisdicción internacional: Derechos humanos y justicia penal [International Juris-
diction: Human Rights and Criminal Justice] 389 (2003); Carmela Ossa Henao, La OEA y el
pretendido ‘retiro’ de la aceptación de la jurisdicción obligatoria de la Corte Interamericana de Dere-
chos Humanos por el gobierno peruano (1999–2000) [The OAS and the Purported “Withdrawal”
of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights by the
Peruvian Government (1999–2000)], in 2 Os rumos do Direito Internacional dos Direitos
Humanos [Trends in the International Law of Human Rights Law] 323, 323–92 (Renato
Zerbini Ribeiro Leão ed., 2005); Douglass Cassel, El Perú se retira del Corte: ¿Afrontará el reto el
Sistema Americano de Derechos Humanos?, Rev. IIDH, Jan.–June 1999, at 69; Christina Cerna,
Questions on International Law raised by Peru’s “withdrawal” from the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in 2 Os rumos do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, supra, at
353, 353–92; see also Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 54, ¶¶ 36, 46, 49, 50, 53 (Sept. 24, 1999); Constitutional Court v. Peru, Competence, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶¶ 35, 45, 48, 49, 52 (Sept. 24, 1999).
39 Take into account the “reflection” of 2012 to 2013, which led to an Extraordinary General
Assembly of the OAS (April 2013), in which it was decided to keep open critical reflection on the
Inter-American system for the protection of human rights. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Res. 1/2013
(Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/Resolution1-2013eng.pdf
(incorporating various changes in the functioning of this body of the OAS).
40 In other stages, the Court proposed, “to initiate an expanded process of a shared review and
examination . . . [which] could lead to useful suggestions on ways to correct, reform, advance, and
consolidate.” Sergio García Ramírez (Vice-President of the Inter-Am. Ct. of Hum. Rts.), Reflections
on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Based on the Report of its Work Presented to the
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, ¶ 10, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/CAJP-2131/04 add. 1
(Mar. 11, 2004); see also O.A.S. G.A. Res. 2043 (XXXIV), Observations and Recommendations on
the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (June 8, 2004).
41 This is the opinion of Manuel Becerra Ramírez, who provided a list of changes that, in his
opinion, require the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. Becerra Ramírez, supra note 12,
158–59.
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velopment it has now attained, and national systems would lack a particularly
rigorous and effective mechanism for asserting rights and liberties. The indis-
pensable participation of the private sector—which must be favored—is also
demonstrated by the positive accompaniment of victims by non-governmental
organizations,42 as well as in the extensive presentation of amicus curiae briefs
before the Inter-American jurisdiction,43 as permitted by the regulation of the
Inter-American Court.44
It is also necessary to highlight the presence of what I have called “emerg-
ing actors,” among them the Ombudsmen and national public defenders, whose
participation raised some objections because they were state organs appearing
in international litigation on the side of the victims.45 The actions of the public
defenders helped establish the “Inter-American defender.”46
V Role of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Unlike other international tribunals and supervisory mechanisms, the Inter-
American Court has known how to assume—with realism and efficacy—that
which I understand is its institutional role as a human rights tribunal in the re-
gion where it operates: An agency for generating renewed Inter-American human
rights law, that establishes, by means of addressing large themes in especially
transcendent cases, the criteria that will guide the national courts in a broad
process of their reception of Inter-American Law. In thirty years of work,47 the
Inter-American Court has gradually reinforced this institutional role, which may
be expected to achieve its best results to the extent that the impact of the Inter-
American jurisdiction penetrates national orders and practices.
42 See Viviana Krsticevic, El papel de las ONG en el sistema interamericano de protección de los
derechos humanos: Trámite de los casos ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [The
Role of NGOs in the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: Case Procedure before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], in 1 El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de
los DerechosHumanos en el Umbral del Siglo XXI [The Inter-American System ofHuman
Rights Protection at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century] 407, 409 (2d ed. 2003);
González Morales, La participación de la sociedad civil en el sistema interamericano de derechos
humanos [The Participation of Civil Society in the Inter-American System of Human Rights], in
Sistema interamericano de derechos humanos, supra note 2, at 213; García Ramírez, La Corte
Interamericana, supra note 19, at 39.
43 See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovermental Organizations in International Judi-
cial Proceedings, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 611, 638 (1994). The Ombudsman of Central America acted as
amicus curiae for the purposes ofOC-18/03, September 17, 2003, through their technical secretariat,
which then fell to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights.
44 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. of
Hum. Rts. arts. 2(3), 44 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure], http://www.corteidh.or.
cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf.
45 See García Ramírez, La Corte Interamericana, supra note 19, at 41–42.
46 See Rules of Procedure, supra note 44, arts. 2(11), 37.
47 In the first stage of “unique” features, it did not receive contentious cases from the either the
Commission (until now the only supplier) or the states. It first gave attention to providing advisory
opinions and then only in a few contentious cases. See Buergenthal, supra note 33, at 20; González
Morales, supra note 2, at 46–47. About the initial problems that generated the coexistence of the
Commission and the Court, see Symposium, Regional Approaches to Human Rights: The Inter-
American Experience, Proc. 72d Ann. Meeting Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 197 (1978).
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Nowadays, the Inter-American Court is an organ that emits general—but
mandatory—guidelines for the formation of an American ius commune in its
subject matter. In contrast, it is not—and never was—a jurisdictional organ of
third or fourth instance,48 nor is it a tribunal designed to intervene repeatedly
in innumerable cases of the same nature in order to affirm, through hundreds
or thousands of resolutions, a consistent thesis. If it attempted that, it would
drown.
Fortunately, the Inter-American Commission, the states subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction, and even the victims—and of course the Court itself—have under-
stood this institutional role, in which the Court carries out its judicial mission
of hierarchical supremacy and international application. They have adhered to
this role, which defines the Court’s task and permits its progress without seri-
ously misplaced efforts. The Commission has regulated its referrals of cases to
the Court.49 After thirty years, the number of complaints and judgments is not
very high.50
VI National Reception of International Human Rights Law
The relation between states or national systems, and international or suprana-
tional jurisdiction, entails a debate between the rule of the national legal order
and the domain of the international legal order.51 Here arises a larger point,
which, if carefully taken into account, may lead to plausible solutions in the
journey in defense of human rights. It will not be easy in this discussion to find a
conceptual solution unanimously accepted, perhaps neither is it absolutely nec-
essary to achieve unanimity by overriding contrary ideas and wills. There are
factors that mitigate the conflict, such as the growing recognition of the special
48 This statement, highlighted various times by the system’s organizational bodies, was reiterated
by the author of this Article in his speech as President of the Inter-American Court at the beginning
of the session held in Brasilia on May 28, 2006. See García Ramírez, La Corte Interamericana, supra
note 19, at 205.
49 The Rules of the Commission set out the elements for the latter to consider to support the
submission of cases to the Court; among them: the need to develop or clarify the jurisprudence
of the system and the possible effect of the decision on the laws by the member states. Inter-Am.
Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices,
art. 45(2)(c)–(d) (Mar. 18, 2013), reprinted in Inter-Am. Commission on Human Rights, Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
mandate/Basics/RulesIACHR2013.pdf (last visited June 25, 2015).
50 Note that the number of cases subject to this Court’s jurisdiction is reduced—and continues
to remain so; I have said that this would be a condition of success for the continental protection of
human rights, per the Inter-American Court. In the course of its history (until February 24, 2014)
the Court has issued 275 judgments on 174 cases resolved in this venue. Annual judgments, whose
numbers are proportionate to corresponding demands (or submissions of cases) have helped to avoid
a backlog of cases: eighteen in 2008, nineteen in 2009, nine in 2010, eighteen in 2011, twenty-one
in 2012, and sixteen in 2013. See Archive Decisions, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., http://www.oas.
org/en/iachr/decisions/archive.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
51 Regarding the normative range of international treaties on human rights, see Carlos M. Ayala
Corao, La jerarquía de los tratados de derechos humanos [The Heirarchy of Human Rights Treaties],
in El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos [The
Future of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection] 141 (Juan E. Méndez
& Francisco Cox eds., 1998).
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nature of human rights treaties;52 and there exist, above all, paths of understand-
ing that constitute true “bridges” between the international and national legal
orders, sowing harmony where there was division and confrontation.53
These paths or bridges imply national decisions of the highest importance
and open the door to attaining the most effective protection of human rights
through norms emanating from both international and national sources of law.
This has opened a way for the drafting and consolidation of a Latin American
ius commune on human rights, and a means and method for a reasonable and
acceptable accommodation of international law and national law. This will also
evidently require creative decisions and transformations within each state.
This is the field of operation of one of the most important current develop-
ments: the national reception of the international order.54 It occurs in the most
diverse fields, but the one that concerns me here is international human rights
law (IHRL), the characteristics of which differ from those of other fields of the
international legal order. So when I refer below to the topic of national recep-
tion, it should be understood that I am referring only to the international human
rights system. To pretend that the patterns of reception of IHRL apply also in
those other fields, serves only to introduce complications and resistance, and to
foment “mix-ups” between the state and the universal and regional systems. I
am, of course, aware that this introduces particularities with regard to the recep-
tion of IHRL and leaves aside, or implies differing modalities, at least to some
degree, for the entry of other international norms into national legal orders.
The bridges or paths of linkage between the realms of national and inter-
national norms have a distinctive nature and operate in various fields: political,
normative, and practical. For this to occur, and for the crossing of the bridges
to perform the function we attribute to it, it is necessary to establish, as I will
attempt to do below, the force of the international norms vis-à-vis the national
52 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) no. 2, ¶ 29
(Sept. 24, 1982). The Inter-American Court cites the European judgments in the cases Ireland v.
United Kingdom and Soering v. United Kingdom, in the resolution of the Ivcher-Bronstein case.
Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 54, ¶ 45 (Sept. 24,
1999) (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 239 (1978); Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 87 (1989)). In regards to this issue and the interpretation
of treaties on human rights, see Sagüés, supra note 25, at 331; José Luis Caballero Ochoa, La
incorporación de los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos en España y
México [The Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties in Spain and Mexico] 13 (2009).
53 SeeGarcía Ramírez, LaNavegación Americana, supra note 19; see also Sergio García Ramírez,
Recepción de la jurisprudencia interamericana sobre derechos humanos en el derecho interno [Re-
ception of the Inter-American Jurisprudence on Human Rights in Domestic Law], 2008 Anuario
de Der. Constitucional Latinoamericano [Latin-Am. Y.B. Const. L.] (Instituto de Investi-
gaciones Jurídicas) 353; García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra
note 19, at 17–18.
54 On the domestic reception of international law, its pathways, characteristics, and implications,
see Dinah Shelton, Introduction to International Law and Domestic Legal Systems 1 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2011); see also Sergio García Ramírez, Admisión de la competencia contenciosa de
la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, in Recepción nacional del Derecho interna-
cional de los derechos humanos y admisión de la competencia contenciosa de la Corte
Interamericana, supra note 31, at 17.
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norms and the nature—binding or merely orientational—of the decisions made
by the international organs with regard to these norms. This equally demands
finding the border between “hard” international law, the effectiveness of which
is recognized by many national constitutions, as we will see below, and inter-
national “soft law,”55 which strengthens through the formation of ever more
general and influential standards.
Highly important, in this same context, for the formation and consolida-
tion of international jurisprudence, with its projections in the establishment of
a gradual and true ius commune, is jurisprudential dialogue (strictly speaking,
jurisdictional dialogue) between different kinds of courts with distinct jurisdic-
tional competencies. This implies a transjudicial communication which would
characterize the relations between diverse tribunals: horizontal and vertical. The
first refers to the relations between various national tribunals and between var-
ious supranational tribunals; the second to the relations between supranational
tribunals and national tribunals.56 This recognizes what has been called a uni-
versal, multi-directional dialogue, built on common universal values.57
The Inter-American Court has promoted this dialogue, both in relation to
other international tribunals and to non-jurisdictional organs—such as human
rights treaty committees—and in relation to domestic tribunals. This last is in-
creasingly frequent and constructive.58
Of course, the dialogue to which I refer is not limited to frequent communi-
cations between jurisdictional organs. It should penetrate more deeply, through
reciprocal contributions that enrich (cross fertilize) the reasoning and decisions
of the tribunals in dialogue.59
VII The Constitutional Bridge
In considering what I have called “bridges” or “paths,” it is worth considering
first and foremost the constitutional bridge.60 If the basic objection to the entry
of international law is state sovereignty, and this has its supreme expression in
55 See Huerta del Toro & Iván Mauricio, El Fenómeno del soft law y las nueva perspectivas del
Derecho Internacional [The Phenomenon of Soft Law and New Perspectives on International Law],
6 Anuario Mexicano de Der. Internacional [Mexican Y.B. Int’l L.] (Instituto de Investiga-
ciones Jurídicas) 513, 513–49 (2006); Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Develop-
ment and Change in International Law, 38 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 850 (1989); Tadensz Gruchalla-
Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law,” 30 McGill L.J. 37 (1984).
56 De Vergottini, supra note 25, at 39.
57 Carlos Ayala Corao, Del diálogo jurisprudencial al control de convencionalidad
[Jurisprudential Dialogue on the Control of Conventionality] 199 (2012).
58 On the dialgoue between international and national tribunals, see id. at 55.
59 Ayala Corao stated that the reception of jurisprudence, like the effect of dialogue between
courts, “must have a useful effect, that is, be relevant and appropriate, in order to maintain con-
sistency with the argument of the judgment”; “it must reasonably lead to the reciprocal ratification
of both constitutional and international jurisprudence, to achieve more reasoned and reasonable
solutions.” See id. at 22–23.
60 See Germán J. Bidart Campos, La interpretación de los derechos humanos en la jurisdicción
internacional y en la jurisdicción interna [The Interpretation of Human Rights in International Ju-
risdiction and under Domestic Law, in La Corte y el Sistema Interamericanos de Derechos
Humanos, supra note 12, at 39, 51 (“The internal reception of international law on human rights
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the constitution of a republic, then naturally the first path of linkage is found
within the rubric of the fundamental law.61 From there, the consequences will
spread throughout the whole normative framework, as they properly should in a
constitutional state. The constitution is the supreme law, to which all secondary
norms must conform. Therefore, from a practical point of view, it is fitting that
the relations between the international system and the national system “are reg-
ulated by constitutional provisions of a general and unilateral character, which
affirm the level of recognition of international conventional law or of particular
provisions of international treaties.”62
United States constitutional law influenced Latin American normative frame-
works in the nineteenth century.63 Recent decades have seen important consti-
tutional reforms in various American nations, with different formulations but
a single goal—the primacy of human rights64—and an alliance, for this pur-
pose, between international treaties and domestic norms. The jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court plays a role in the current constitutionalism in the
region.65
Latin American constitutional reform has a democratic stamp; it is concerned
with the protection of human rights, which it expands; the adoption of the bene-
ficial innovation of the “constitutional block” enriched by these rights;66 extend-
ing jurisdictional guarantees; and diminishing and rationalizing the conditions
does not engender conflicts between international law and democratic constitutions, there is a com-
mon denominator that reconciles the two together.”).
61 From this context emerges the case of the “internationalization of universal human rights”
within the “universal community of constitutional states.” Häberle, supra note 13, at 75; see also,
Caballero Ochoa, supra note 52, at 39; Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Justicia constitucional, om-
budsman y derechos humanos [Constitutional Justice, Ombudsman, and Human Rights]
44 (2d ed. 2001) (“El Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en las constituciones lati-
noamericanas y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.”).
62 De Vergottini, supra note 25, at 88.
63 See Patricia Galeana, Historia comparada de los procesos independentistas de las Américas
[Comparative History of the Indpendence Processes of the Americas], in Historia comparada
de las Américas. Sus procesos independentistas [Comparative History of the Americas:
Their Indpendence Processes] 19 (Patricia Galeana ed., 2010).
64 See Caballero Ochoa, supra note 52, at 45 (explaining the actual prescience human rights
have in constitutional dynamics and relationships between the state and society).
65 See Manuel Eduardo Góngora Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism
243 (2011); Ayala Corao, supra note 57, at 90.
66 See Góngora Mera, supra note 65, at 161; see also Calogero Pizzolo, La relación entre la
Corte Suprema y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a la luz del bloque de constitu-
cionalidad federal [The Relationship between the Supreme Court and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in Light of the Federal Constituionality Block], in El control de convencional-
idad [The Control of Conventionality] 189, 193 (Susana Albanese ed., 2008) (explaining the
reception of this concept from the IHRL in Argentina). In Mexico, the conclusions reached by the
Supreme Court of Justice to discuss the contradicción de tesis 293/2011, August 26 to September 3,
2013, which can be seen in the minutes from public meeting no. 88 on September 2, 2013. See Ses-
sion Publica Núm. 88 [Public Session No. 88], Supreme Corte Judicial de la Nation [Supreme
Court of Justice] (Sept. 2, 2013) (Mex.), http://www.scjn.gob.mx/PLENO/Lista_Actas_de_
las_Sesiones_Publicas/88%20-%202%20de%20septiembre%20de%202013%20(2).pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2015). For an analysis of this question, see Sergio García Ramírez & Juli-
eta Morales Sánchez, La reforma constitucional sobre derechos humanos (2009–2011)
[Constitutional Reform for Human Rights (2009–2011)] at 334 (3d ed. 2013).
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for suspensions and restrictions of rights, which on occasion amounted to noth-
ing less than a “constitutional dictatorship.”67 To be sure, the Inter-American
Court has been outspoken in constraining suspensions of the exercise of rights,
which should serve to preserve the state and to protect democracy,68 not to sup-
press them.
Important expressions of this reformmovement can be found in the constitu-
tions of Peru (of 197969) and of Argentina, but especially the latter.70 In a signif-
icant text, Argentina explicitly “constitutionalized,” through the insertion in the
catalogue of the constitutional text, the most important international human
rights instruments—including the Universal and American Declarations—and
opened the way for the inclusion of others, an advance realized shortly after-
ward.71
I find interesting, and instructive, the conclusions that academic doctrine
draws from the Argentine constitutional reform of 1994. It is said that the re-
form:
incorporated new rights and guarantees into the constitutional sys-
tem; it contributed to inserting the country fully into an international
system of justice for human rights; it stimulated changes in the ad-
ministration of justice; it required a rethinking of the federal orga-
nization; it favored the creation of new public institutions tasked to
design and implement specific government policies on human rights;
67 Diego Valadés, La dictadura constitucional en América Latina [The Constitu-
tional Dictatorship in Latin America] 47 (1974); see also Cecilia Medina Quiroga, La Con-
vención Americana [The American Convention] 45 (2003) (explaining the suspension of the
exercise of rights and freedoms in conformity with the ACHR).
68 See generally Florentín Meléndez Padilla, La suspensión de los derechos fundamen-
tales en los estados de excepción según el derecho internacional de los derechos hu-
manos [The Suspension of Fundamental Rights in States of Emergency under Interna-
tional Human Rights Law] 109 (1999); Valadés, supra note 67, at 47.
69 “In the case of conflict with the treaty (international as signed by Peru) the former prevails.”
Constitución Política del Perú [C.P.] of 1979, art. 101 (Peru). “The provisions contained in
human rights treaties have constitutional hierarchy. They cannot be modified except by the proce-
dure governing the reform of the Constitution.” Id. art. 105. “Exhausted domestic remedies, for
anyone who considers the rights recognized by the Constitution, the courts may resort to interna-
tional organizations established under treaties to which Peru is a party.” Id., art. 305 (under the Title
“Constitutional Guarantees,” on the purpose of the Warranty Court). See generally Constitución
Nacional [Const. Nac.] (Arg.); Constitución Política de la República de Guatemala [C.P.],
art. 46. But see Constitución Política del Perú [C.P.] of 1979, art. 105 (recognizing with “more
strength” the primacy of international law in human rights); see also Héctor Fix-Zamudio, supra
note 61, at 452.
70 See Gozaíni, supra note 70, at 81, 98 (explaining that, before the constitutional reform of
1994, Argentina recognized obligatory decisions adopted through transnational justice).
71 The second paragraph of Article 75 establishes the relationship between declarations and
treaties that possess constitutional standing. Art. 75, Constitución Nacional [Const. Nac.]
(Arg.). The third paragraph of the same Article fixes the procedure (by vote of a qualified majority
of the members of each house of Congress) for other treaties and conventions on human rights to
acquire the same hierarchy. Id.; see Jorge R. Vanossi, Los tratados internacionales ante la reforma
de 1994 [International Treaties Before the 1994 Reform], in La aplicación de los tratados so-
bre derechos humanos por los tribunales locales [The Application of Human Rights
Treaties in Local Courts] 105 (Martín Abregú & Christian Courtis eds., 1997).
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and it contributed to the consolidation of an academic discipline that
debated and supported the application of these standards and prin-
ciples in different fields of public and private law.72
Other countries have brought different formulas to the same goal of constitu-
tional protection of persons. They commonly provide that international human
rights norms that proscribe restrictions of rights, or which recognize more or
better protection of persons, prevail in the internal legal order.73
Such provisions embody the principle pro homine or pro persona74—adopted
by the Inter-American Court, among other bodies—which resolves, in terms
favorable to the human being, the tension between the internal and interna-
tional legal orders. Even so, the emphasis on pro homine does not necessar-
ily avoid occasional recurrences to the primacy of constitutional law that re-
stricts internationally-recognized rights.75 Attention should be paid to this phe-
nomenon, which is inconsistent with the general obligations of a state party to
the American Convention.76
VIII Other Bridges
In additional to constitutionalization, there is the path of ordinary legislation,
through provisions that receive, internalize, or implement norms of more general
application. While the constitutional reception of international human rights
norms has flourished, there is an appreciable deficit in the legislative reception
of those norms and of the decisions of international organs of protection. In
72 Víctor Abramovich, Prólogo [Introduction] to La aplicación de los tratados sobre dere-
chos humanos en el ámbito local. La experencia de una década [The Application of Hu-
man Rights Treaties in Local Areas: The Experience of One Decade] 1 (Víctor Abramovich
et al. eds., 2007); see also Pizzolo, supra note 66, at 189.
73 See Constitución Política de Colombia [C.P.] arts. 93, 94; Constitución Política del
Estado [C.P.] art. 13, pts. II, IV (Bol.); Id. art. 256; Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution]
art. 5(77)(2) (Braz.); Constitución de la República del Ecuador [Constitution] arts. 417,
424; Constitución Politica de la República de Guatemala [C.P.] art. 46; Constitution de
la République d’Haïti art. 19; Constitutción Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[C.P.] art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-
2014 (Mex.); Constitución Política de la República de Panamá [C.P.] [Constitution] art. 17
(Pan.); Constitución Política del Perú [C.P.] of 1979, tit. VIII (Peru); Id. art. 2; Constitución
de la República Dominica [Constitution] art. 74(1), (3), (4) (Dom. Rep.); Constitución de
la República [Constitution] art. 72 (Uru.); Constitución de la República Boliviriana de
Venezuela [Constitution] art. 23 (amended 2009) (Venez.).
74 Regarding this principle, its reach and limitations, see Sagüés, supra note 25, at 325–26.
75 See García Ramírez & Morales Sánchez, supra note 66, at 338. Currently, highly rele-
vant sources estimate that a constitution prevails when it stipulates limitations or restrictions on
internationally recognized rights. See also Margarita Beatriz Luna Ramos, Supremacía Constitu-
cional y Control de Convencionalidad [Constitutional Supremacy and Control of Conventionality],
in El control de convencionalidad y las cortes nacionales: La perspectiva de los jueces
mexicanos [The Control of Conventionality and National Court: The Perspective of
Mexican Judges] 30–39 (Paula M. García Villegas Sánchez Cordero ed., 2013).
76 It is inconsistent to the extent that it violates a general obligation of the state to respect and
guarantee the rights and freedoms enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention. See
Medina Quiroga, supra note 67, at 21 (regarding the obligation to take action).
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this regard, there have been only a few laws of implementation.77 The deficit is
revealed as more serious when national laws do not require compliance with in-
ternational decisions declaring violations and requiring payment of money dam-
ages. The innovative and expansive character of Inter-American rules on the legal
consequences of international wrongs requires a much wider and more complex
normative response, which national states have not adopted, and on which the
efficacy of Inter-American jurisprudence depends in appreciable measure.78
Another form of internalization is constituted by public policies incorporat-
ing human rights and their various implications in all fields of political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural life. It is clear that the state and society do not carry
out their mission in reality only by adopting constitutional, legislative, and reg-
ulatory norms; they do so, above all, through the carrying out of public policies
with a human rights meaning or perspective. Some states have broad human
rights policies (with “transversal” effect, as it is said), which constitute good in-
struments for receiving rights and giving them concrete practical application.79
On the same horizon of reception are the formation and consolidation of a
culture of human rights.80 I already mentioned, citing an Italian professor, the
role of democratic customs in the observance of democratic constitutions. It is
not easy to give root to this culture in countries that historically have suffered
authoritarian or dictatorial—even totalitarian—experiences. Granted, these ex-
periences are not that distant, to be sure, from the “subcultures” of other con-
tinents, which are customarily deemed—with short memories—to enjoy better
traditions. But be that as it may, one must acknowledge that the countries of
our America are far from having a true culture, respected and cultivated,81 of
human rights.
Here I cannot avoid mentioning the role played by adverse conditions in
the field of public security. This situation, which overwhelms some countries of
Latin America (or perhaps all), engenders a siege against human rights, which
are blamed for the prevailing insecurity. It brings not only the undesirable expan-
77 For example, inMexico: Ley Federal de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado [LFRPE] [The
Federal Law on State Responsibility], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 31-12-2004, últimas
reformas DOF 12-06-2009; LeyGeneral de Víctimas [LGV] [General Law of Victims], Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DOF] 09-01-2013, últimas reformas DOF 03-05-2013. In Peru: Código Procesal
Constitucional [Cód. Proc. Const.] [Constitutional Procedural Code], art. 115.
78 This end is served, in Mexico, by the General Law of Victims published (after some legisla-
tive vicissitudes) on January 9, 2013, which seeks a “comprehensive redress,” on a broad spectrum
(Article 1), and that has as its subjects the victims of crimes and human rights violations (Article 2),
and that is interpreted in conjunction with the Constitution and human rights treaties “favoring at
all times the most ample protection of the rights of persons” (Article 3). See LGV, arts. 1–3 (Mex.).
79 Here, for example, Mexico has embarked on the development of a so-called National
Human Rights Program. See Programa Nacional de Derechos Humano [National Human
Rights Program], Secretaría de Gobernación (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.ordenjuridico.
gob.mx/Federal/PE/APF/APC/SEGOB/Programas/05082005(1).pdf; see also García Ramírez
& Morales Sánchez, supra note 66, at 45.
80 See Alfred Fernandez & Geoffrey Gowlland, Towards a Culture of Human Rights
(2006).
81 See Sergio García Ramírez, Los derechos humanos y el derecho penal [Human
Rights and Criminal Law] 175–76 (2d ed. 1988).
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sion of the punitive apparatus,82 but also the excesses—which a certain sector
of society views with complacency—of indiscriminate and prohibited methods
of investigation, prosecution, and enforcement. A contradiction is proposed be-
tween due process (with its importance for human rights) and crime control.83
These false dilemmas weaken the culture of human rights, which is viewed with
distrust by partisans of the “hard hand.”
The Inter-American Court, given its own function of protecting rights, has
demanded of national systems at least two actions to halt the culture of viola-
tions and encourage the culture of rights. On one hand, timely compliance with
their general duty of guarantees, suppressing obstacles to bringing violators to
justice,84 a topic associated with an unwavering rejection of impunity, which
the Court has highlighted in its jurisprudence and which remains as one of the
“weak flanks” of the system;85 on the other hand, the training of justice officials
82 See Luigi Ferrajoli, Criminalidad y globalización [Criminality and Globalization], Iter Crimi-
nis: Rev. de Ciencias Penales [Iter Criminis: J. Crim. Sci.], Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 71, 78; Joachim
Vogel, Derecho penal y globalización [Criminal Law and Globalization], 9 Anuario de la Fac-
ultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid [Y.B. Fac. L. Autonomous U.
Madrid] 113, 117 (2005); Daniel Erbetta, Postmodernidad y globalización: ¿hacia dónde va el
Derecho penal? [Post-Modernity and Globalization: Where Does the Criminal Law Go?], in El
Derecho Privado ante la internacionalidad, la integración y la globalización [Private
Law before Internationalization, Integration, and Globalization] 75, 79, 83 (Carlos A.
Hernández ed., 2005).
83 The debate on the options has been initially discussed in the United States as a trade-off be-
tween crime control and due process. “On one side, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system,
conceived as a system of crime control . . . . On the other, procedural guarantees (due process)
transforms the penal system into an obstacle course.” The “question of process options in Europe is
reflected in the opposition between efficiency in the investigation of offenses and their perpetrators,
and the respect for the fundamental human rights of the person,” although it has also been pointed
out that both sides can be reconciled in a “bipolarity of the criminal process.” Procesos penales
de europa [Criminal Procedure in Europe] 40–41 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., Pablo Morenilla
Allard, trans., Edijus 2000) (1995); see also Sergio García Ramírez, Reflexiones sobre democracia y
justicia penal [Reflections on Democracy and Crimial Justice], in 1 Homenaje al Dr. Marino Bar-
bero Santos [Tribunes to Dr. Marino Barbero Santos] (Luis A. Arroyo Zapatero & Ignacio
Berdugo Gómez de la Torre eds., 2001).
84 This is a topic that calls for careful examination in light of the principles that govern a state’s
obligation of justice and those of reality that impose conditions and restrictions. See, e.g., José Za-
laquett, Derechos humanos y limitaciones políticas en las transiciones democráticas del Cono Sur
[Human Rights and Political Constraints on Democratic Transitions in the Southern Sphere], Rev.
IIDH, July–Dec. 1991, at 91. This article analyzes (in a time before definitions were adopted by
the Inter-American Court and some states) the “ethical, legal and practical complexities” which ac-
company situations of “political transition.” Id. at 131; see also Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, La
lutte contre l’impunité dans le système interaméricain des Droits de l’homme [The Fight Against Im-
punity in the Inter-American System of Human Rights], in Los derechos humanos frente a la
impunidad [Human Rights Against Impunity] 89 (J. Soroeta ed., Cursos de Derechos Humanos
de Donostia-San Sebastián Ser. No. 10, 2009). The responses of the Inter-American Court against
attempts to circumvent the pursuit of these facts have been “intransigent.” Id. at 90.
85 See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14,
2001); Gomes Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 147 (Nov. 24, 2010); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Repa-
rations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, ¶ 232 (Feb. 24, 2011); Massacres of El
Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 283 (Oct. 25, 2012). On the invalidity of criminal and procedural concepts
that block the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes, see Douglass Cassel, Lecciones de las
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in matters of human rights,86 and including, more ambitiously, the intervention
of the state—an intervention of undeniable cultural significance—in order to re-
move deep-rooted patterns and factors militating against human rights.87 The
Court has likewise rejected settlements between victims and perpetrators that
are inconsistent with public order in criminal matters and with human rights.88
IX The Jurisdictional Bridge
We now come to another bridge between the international and national orders:
the jurisdictional path.89 This implies the reception of IHRL norms and the pro-
nouncements of the Inter-American Court by national tribunals, which tradition-
ally (and surely still, to a high degree) are reluctant or resistant to the winds of
the international system. Not infrequently in hearings before the Inter-American
Court, state representatives base their positions, subject to final dispositions by
national courts, on grounds of “division of powers” and the “independence of
the judiciary,” which the Inter-American Court has defended vigorously.90 They
go so far as to argue that the international judgment obligates some powers, or
one sector of the state, while others remain immune from this interference.91
The jurisdictional reception, the route for the realization of control of con-
ventionality (a topic I will address at the end of this article), departs from a
Américas: Lineamientos para una respuesta internacional ante la amnistía de atrocidades [Lessons
From the Americas: Guidelines for an International Response to Amnesty for Atrocities], Rev. IIDH,
July–Dec. 1996, at 277; González Morales, supra note 2, at 268; Burgorgue-Larsen, supra note
84.
86 See, e.g., González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 541–42 (Nov. 16, 2009).
87 Id. ¶¶ 531–43.
88 In relation to the duty of justice that concerns the Inter-American Court, the Court has re-
jected the compositional agreements between victim and victimizer for acts constituting a criminal
offense, which are then not subject to the filing of a complaint by the victim. Garrido v. Argentina,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 26, ¶¶ 72–73 (Aug. 27, 1998).
89 In Europe, the impact of international human rights law is relevant—through the 1950
Convention—for the jurisprudence of the constitutional tribunals. There is talk of a “conventional
nationalization” in this area. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, L’influence de la Convention européenne
sur le fonctionnement des Cours Constitutionnelles [The Influence of the European Convention on
the Operaton of Constitutional Courts], 60 Revue internationale de droit comparé [Int’l Rev.
Comp. L.] 247, 265 (2008).
90 The attack on the proper integration of the courts affects democratic judicial review, that
is, the “review of the adequacy of the State’s conduct per the Constitution.” Constitutional
Court v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71,
¶ 112 (Jan. 31, 2001); see also Sergio García Ramírez, El debido proceso en la jurispru-
dencia. De la corte interamericana [Due Process in Case Law: The Inter-American
Court of the Human Rights] 25 (2012), http://www.ijf.cjf.gob.mx/cursosesp/2012/
jornadasitinerantes/procesoSGR.pdf.
91 Invariably, the Inter-American Court is not a criminal court; therefore, it does not designate
responsibilities of this type. In this regard, the Court noted that it “is not compatible with the Con-
vention to agree that specific individuals are or are not guilty and must or must not be prosecuted.”
Huilca-Tecse v. Peru,Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121,
¶¶ 105–06 (Mar. 3, 2005). Decisions on these matters fall to domestic criminal jurisdictions.
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double premise: Judges are the primordial guarantors of human rights,92 and
states are fully committed to observing human rights and to complying with the
obligations resulting from their neglect or violation.
On the international plane, the state appears and is obligated as “a whole”;93
as a consequence, it is responsible for illicit behaviors by any of its agents or
officials, and even, in certain circumstances, for transgressions committed by
non-state actors.94 This broad scope of attribution of state responsibility consti-
tutes one of the strongest elements of the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence,
notably important for the relation between the Court and the states, especially
when states take advantage of persons or groups formally unconnected to the
state structure (but in reality linked to it) to carry out activities related to public
safety or national security.95
X Force of International Human Rights Law Provisions
The Inter-American Court has addressed the content and force of the provisions
of IHRL, a topic that can lead to points of debate, resistance, or disagreement
with the states. Let us acknowledge, in the first place, that the imperatives of
Inter-American human rights law have a complex content, which must be ad-
dressed in this same dimension. That content includes both the conventional
precept—accepted by the state by its act of ratification or adhesion—and the
interpretation of that precept—equally accepted by the state when it recognized
the role of the tribunal as interpreter and applier of the conventional norm.96
Doubt has frequently been expressed as to the binding or merely orienta-
tional—the equivalent of “suggestive”—character of decisions of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court.97 A distinction is proposed that “calibrates” the reach of these deci-
92 See García Ramírez, supra note 90, at 35; La justicia como garante de los derechos
humanos: la independencia del juez [Justice as Guarantor of Human Rights: The Inde-
pendence of the Judge] (Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni & Kurt Madlener eds., 1996).
93 Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 101, ¶¶ 27–31 (Nov. 25, 2003) (García Ramírez, J., concurring).
94 See Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶¶ 125(1), (25), 133 (July 1, 2006); Mapiripán Mas-
sacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134,
¶¶ 121–23 (Sept. 15, 2005); see also Medina Quiroga, supra note 67, at 28.
95 See Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148; Mapiripán Massacre
v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134; Blake v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, ¶ 75 (Jan. 24, 1998).
96 Article 62(3) of the American Convention states: “[T]he Court has the jurisdiction over all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are
submitted, provided that the States party to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction,
whether by special declaration, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, or by special agreement.”
American Convention of Human Rights, art. 62(3), supra note 30. Regarding the general binding
effect of judgments of the Court, see Becerra Ramírez’s point of view, based on the position of those
within the system of the sources of international law. Becerra Ramírez, supra note 12 at 47–49,
128.
97 The issue of being binding in nature has arisen in connection with the Court, and in rela-
tion to the IACHR, in that it does not produce judgments but recommendations. In this respect,
the positions of the states are diverse. For example, Argentina has recognized the obligatory force
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sions and therefore conditions or dilutes their effectiveness. This position, often
maintained, has to do both with the nature of determinations by the Court,
which in no event, of course, lose their jurisdictional character, and with the
extent of their impact on the state parties as a whole.
The first position mentioned argues for a distinction between the “decision”
of the Court in contentious cases, rendered in the form of a judgment, and the
“appreciation” of the Court in advisory proceedings, expressed in the form of
an opinion. In the first situation, the decision is binding for the state, that is a
party in the case.98 In the second situation, the Court’s opinion does not bind
anyone, although it could be “significant” for all. The Court itself has accepted
this distinction,99 which is challenged by academic doctrine100 and nuanced in
the position of a state that recognizes the normative efficacy of a decision that it
solicited by requesting an advisory opinion.101
The second point to consider on this subject, with obvious repercussions for
the functioning of the Inter-American jurisdiction and its relation with the states,
distinguishes, on the one hand, between the state that is party to the litigation,
and on the other hand, the effects of the decision with respect to states not parties
to the case in which the decision is made.102
of the Commission’s decisions that interpret conventional norms, but it has also stated that those
are “moral, and expressed by taking all the necessary efforts to ensure compliance.” See Gozaíni,
supra note 68, at 109–11. The Inter-American Court has addressed this issue through its relevant
judgments. Caballero-Delgado v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22,
¶ 66 (Dec. 8, 1995); Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33,
¶¶ 80–81 (Sept. 17, 1997).
98 See Gelman v. Uruguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Con-
trol of Conventionality,” ¶¶ 87–88 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gelman_20_03_13_ing.pdf. The judgments of the Inter-American
Court have the effect of res judicata and are binding, which derives from the ratification of the Con-
vention and the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court, and sovereign acts made by the party
states. Furthermore, once a state has ratified an international treaty and recognized the jurisdiction
of its monitoring bodies, it is precisely through its constitutional mechanisms that the treaty comes
to be part of its domestic legal system.
99 See “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, ¶ 51
(Sept. 24, 1982). The Court has stated that the advisory opinions of the Court, like those of other
international tribunals, by their very nature, do not have the same binding effect that is recognized
for its judgments under Article 68 of the Convention.
100 See Alonso Gómez-Robeldo Verduzco, Derechos Humanos en el Sistema Interamer-
icano [Human Rights in the Inter-American System] 46 (2000); see also Faúndez Ledesma,
supra note 25, at 989.
101 So acted Costa Rica. See Corte Suprema de Justica de Costa Rica [Supreme Court], Sala Con-
stitucional [Constitutional Chamber], 9 mayo 1995, acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 421-S-80
(Costa Rica) (citing Compulsory Membership in an Assoc. Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism (Arts. 13 & 29 Am. Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5 (Nov. 13, 1985)) http://jurisprudencia.poder-judicial.go.cr/
SCIJ_PJ/busqueda/jurisprudencia/jur_ficha_sentencia.aspx?nValor2=81561.
102 See JuanCarlosHitters, ¿Son vinculantes los pronunciamientos de la Comisión y de la Corte In-
teramericana de Derechos Humanos? [Are Pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Commission Binding?], in El Control Difuso de Convencional-
idad [The Diffuse Control of Conventionality] 245, 255 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor ed.,
2012). As to the force of decisions of the Inter-American Court with respect to states that were party
to the dispute, Juan Carlos Hitters affirms the effectiveness of those under the concept of the “ripple
136 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
Obviously, the Court’s findings of fact in the litigation and their consequences,
whether the state is liable or not, operate only inter partes. The question does
not end there, but rather inquires as to the efficacy of the Court’s pronounce-
ment with respect to the interpretation of the norms applied in the case sub
judice, which could also be applicable, by their reasoning, to a large number of
disputes.
For good reasons, and with growing force, the answer has emerged that best
fits the design of IHRL and lends greatest efficacy to the jurisdiction established
to guarantee these rights. The Court rules on the facts before it, as between the
parties to the case, but, on occasion, also rules on the meaning and scope of
the rights and liberties consecrated in the applicable instrument as among all
those subject to the observance of the norms that consecrate such rights and
liberties.103
Because the Court has been conferred the power to interpret the Convention,
which is a positive legal order for all state parties to it, the Court possesses the
capacity to define the meaning and scope of the corresponding norms. This is
true not only for purposes of a concrete case, but also for all hypotheses arising
from the case. The evident result is that a resolution of the tribunal has a double
role: inter partes, with respect to the facts and their immediate and direct con-
sequences; and erga omnes, with respect to the conventional norms and their
interpretation in all cases.104 This binding character of the jurisprudence105 of
the Court applies both to advisory opinions,106 which entail the interpretation
of a precept by the official interpreter of the norms, and to the judgments, which
implicate the same function on the part of this organ.
The Inter-American Court has emphasized the recognition by high national
courts of the binding effect of its judgments.107 This does not mean that the ob-
effect.” He is less emphatic regarding his position on advisory opinions.
103 García Ramírez, La Navegación Americana, supra note 19, at 467–68.
104 See “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, ¶ 69.
In situations where the State concerned has not been party to the international process
in which the jurisprudence was established, by the mere fact of being party to the
American Convention, all of its public authorities and bodies, including democratic
bodies, judges and other bodies involved in the administration of justice on all levels,
are obligated by the treaty.
Id.
105 I use this term in its broadest understanding, that encompasses the fruit of the jurisdiction: the
law. Included, therefore, is the criteria formally established by the Court to expand its jurisdiction
when any of the following actions are manifest: opinion, judgment, intermediate or interlocutory
judgment, action, decision on compliance. Determinations whose content is purely administrative
remain outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
106 See Faúndez Ledesma, supra note 25, at 989. This point of view, which seems correct to me,
has been strongly supported by Faúndez Ledesma who criticized the expression “advisory opinion”
and who noted that in such circumstances the Inter-American Court operates as “Constitutional
Court” whose interpretive statement of standards has binding effect.
107 It has done this since the judgment in Cabrera García v. Mexico under the heading “Adaptat-
ing domestic law to international standards of justice,” where it alludes to the recognized judgments
of the Inter-American Courts by the High Courts of Costa Rica, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic,
Peru, Argentina, and Colombia. Cabrera García v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Repara-
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stacles that on occasion generate resistance in the internal judicial order have
disappeared.108 All in all, it may be affirmed that on the basis of that binding
effect the orientation receptor of Inter-American jurisprudence has reached do-
mestic tribunals of diverse rank and has spread among the totality of the member
states of the system. The states are bound by the norms of the international in-
struments to which they are parties, and subject to the official interpretation of
them, without prejudice, of course, to other dispositions that may improve on
the interpretation of the American Convention under the rule of the principle
pro persona.109
XI Control of Conventionality
The previous discussion is closely related—by imposing conditions—with a de-
rivative concept that is gaining importance in various countries of the region,
with differing emphasis: the control of conventionality.110 This constitutes “a
tions, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶¶ 226–32 (Nov. 26, 2010). The resolution on
monitoring compliance in Gelman v. Uruguay will be incorporated with the decisions of other coun-
tries: Guatemala, Mexico and Panama. Sagüés indicates that the admission of the Inter-American
Court’s criteria by the highest national courts presents the following panorama: express acceptance,
qualified tacit acceptance (rises to a higher court), partial tacit acceptance (the Constitution is not
subject to control), silence or tacit denial. Néstor P. Sagüés, El control de convencionalidad en el Sis-
tema Interamericano y sus anticipos en el ámbito de los derechos ecoómico-sociales. Concordancias
y diferencias con el Sistema Europeo [The Control of Conventionality in the Inter-American System
and its Advances in the Field of Economic and Social Rights: Similarities and Differences with the
European System], in El Control Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 421, 431.
108 See Osvaldo Alfredo Gozaíni, El impacto de la jurisprudencia del sistema interamericano en el
derecho interno [The Impact of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American System on Domestic Law],
in El control de convencionalidad, supra note 66, at 81, 83–84, 91–92 (with respect to the
possible conflict between constitutional courts and ordinary courts, “[I]t has little relevance when it
comes to resolving human rights, because for them the only law to be applied is that which comes
from the jurisdiction of the State itself recognized at the time of joining the system.”).
109 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 29.
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as:
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or ex-
ercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict
them to a greater extent than is provided for herein;
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by
virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to
which one of the said states is a party;
c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality
or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
Id.
110 On the origin of the doctrine of control of conventionality, see De Vergottini, supra note 25,
at 112; Ernesto Rey Cantor, Control de Convencionalidad de las Leyes y Derechos Hu-
manos [Control of Conventionality of Laws and Human Rights] 46, 167–71 (2008); Juan
Carlos Hitters, Control de constitucionalidad y control de convencionalidad. Comparación [Consti-
tutional Control and Conventional Control: Comparison], 7 Estudios Constitucionales [Const.
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guarantee designed to obtain the harmonious application of applicable law,”111
a concept which, to this end, touches on norms from both relevant sources: inter-
national and national, under the “guide” of the former. It seems obvious that the
Inter-American Court, which hears cases involving national acts allegedly in vio-
lation of international norms, should exercise a control over whether those acts
are consistent with the requirements of the Convention.112 This entails a match-
ing, a confrontation, and a comparison between the national acts and the con-
ventional norms—stressing the preeminence of the conventional norms—which
are the subject matter of the Court’s analysis and the reason for its determina-
tions.113
It should be mentioned at this point that the control of conventionality (a
duty imposed on a universe of obligated persons to which I will allude below,
and which, in addition, is not yet completely defined) should not be confused
with the general obligation of observance and subordination to the dispositions
of IHRL (a duty imposed on all public authorities, as indicated, for example,
by Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution, and even on private parties). This
observance or subordination reflects the duty that each person has with respect
to his own conduct, personally, in the terms required by legal provisions. In
contrast, the obligation of control is exercised with respect to a third party, the
“controlled subject,” whose acts are examined by the “controlling subject” to
verify their conformity with the requirements of IHRL (or with national human
rights laws) and to apply, for that purpose, particular measures with certain
Stud.], no. 1, 2009, at 109, 109–14; Sagüés, supra note 25, at 449; Sagüés, supra note 107, at 442;
Sagüés, supra note 25, at 344–46; Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Interpretación conforme y con-
trol difuso de convencionalidad. El nuevo paradigma para el juez mexicano [Interpretation-Based
Diffuse Control of Conventionalty: A Paradigm for the Mexican Judge], in El Control Difuso
de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 107, 132–33; Victor Bazán, Estimulando sinergias: de
diálogos jurisprudenciales y control de convencionalidad [Stimulating Synergies: Jurisprudential Di-
alogue and Control of Conventionality], in El Control Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra
note 102, at 11; Ayala Corao, supra note 57, at 133, 142 n.502, 147 n.509; José Luis Caballero
Ochoa, La interpretación conforme: el modelo constitucional ante los tratados in-
ternacionales sobre derechos humanos y el control de convencionalidad [Consistent
Interpretation: The Constitutional Model to International Treaties on Human Rights
and the Control of Conventionality] 75–76 (2013); Emmanuel Rosales, En busca del acorde
perdido o la necesidad de un lenguaje común para el análisis sistemático de la aplicación del derecho
internacional de derechos humanos por cortes nacionales [In Search of the Lost Chord or the Need
for a Common Language for the Systematic Analysis of the Application of International Human
Rights Law byNational Courts], in El control de convencionalidad y las cortes nacionales:
La perspectiva de los jueces mexicanos, supra note 75, at 180.
111 Susan Albanese, La internacionalización del derecho constitucional y constitucionalización del
derecho internacional [The Internationalization of Constitutional Law and Constitutionalization of
International Law], in El control de convencionalidad, supra note 66, at 1, 15.
112 See Ernesto Rey Cantor, Controles de convencionalidad de las leyes [Control of Conventional-
ity of the Law], in El Control Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 391, 393. Rey
Cantor broadly refers to the development of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, in vari-
ous stages, on the power of confrontation between national provisions and international standards,
depending on which implicates the implied doctrine of control of conventionality.
113 See Karlos A. Castilla Juárez, El control de convencionalidad. Un nuevo debate en México a
partir del Caso Radilla Pacheco [The Control of Conventionality: A NewDebate inMexico From the
Case of Radilla Pancheco], in El Control Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 81,
91. Only the Inter-American Court—not national judges—can exercise control of conventionality.
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consequences, to which I will refer below.
It has been said that the mission of the international tribunal as a “control-
ling subject” is similar, in certain essential respects, to that of a national consti-
tutional tribunal, called upon to pass on the “constitutional quality” of the act
of a domestic authority, taking as a point of reference the text of the supreme
internal norm and its interpretation by the constitutional organ.114
Ever since the first espousal of control of conventionality, initially in sepa-
rate opinions and shortly thereafter, in an evolutionary manner, in the jurispru-
dence of the full Court, the concept has gained in prestige and further develop-
ment.115 The Inter-American Court has formulated definitions and specificities
concerning the control of conventionality, which have brought about an impor-
tant evolution in this regard.116 Nonetheless, there still does not exist among
the countries of our region a universally accepted conception of control of con-
ventionality; of the procedure or method for exercising it, its consequences, or
subjects empowered to apply it;117 or of the situations to which it should be ap-
plied.118 Accordingly, what I say in this section should be taken with caution,
bearing in mind the particularities of each national regime and even of each ana-
lyst or person applying this new control. The very fact that there is a great variety
of solutions and opinions makes obvious the need to carry out an orderly reex-
114 Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 3 (Sept. 7, 2004) (García Ramírez, J., concurring).
In a certain sense, the work of the Court is similar to that undertaken by the con-
stitutional courts. Those examine contested acts—general provisions—in light of the
rules, principles and values of fundamental laws. The Inter-American Court, for its
part, analyzes the acts within their jurisdiction in relation to the norms, principles,
and values of the treaties that form the basis of its jurisdiction. Said in another way, if
the constitutional courts control “constitutionality,” the international court of human
rights decides on the “conventionality” of such acts. Through the control of constitu-
tionality, internal bodies shape the activity of public power—and eventually of other
social agents—with the legal order that forms the core of a democratic society. The
Inter-American Court, meanwhile, aims to conform to its activities to the interna-
tional order bestowed during the founding convention for the Court’s jurisdiction
and accepted by the Party States through the exercising of their sovereignty.
Id.; see also Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, ¶ 4 (Nov. 24, 2006)
(García Ramírez, J., concurring).
115 See Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 101, ¶ 27 (Nov. 25, 2003) (García Ramírez, J., concurring).
116 On this matter, see Becerra Ramírez’s comment and review of the evolution of control of com-
pliance. Becerra Ramírez, supra note 12, at 123 (“The concept of control of compliance . . . that
the doctrine has developed in recent years has several inaccuracies.”) (footnote omitted).
117 See Ayala Corao, supra note 57, at 162–64. In his examination of compliance control, Ayala
Corao accurately notes the content of the control: It encompasses all the acts and conduct of the
state, it is exercised by the organs of the state, judges have a special obligation towards this respect,
the parameter is the ACHR, it should be performed by state bodies within their jurisdiction and
relevant procedural regulations, the result must be effective, and the lack of control gives rise to the
international responsibility of the state.
118 “Compliance control has a complementary nature and therefore is an exceptional mechanism
that is not exercisable in all cases.” Sergio Flores Navarro &Victorino Rojas Rivera, Control
de Convencionalidad [Control of Conventionality] 27 (2013).
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amination of this protective guarantee, which is informed by winds of diverse
natures and with different and uncertain end results.
It is desirable to arrive soon at basic agreement in regard to questions con-
cerning the control of conventionality, which are often fomented by “enthusi-
asm” and rising expectations. Basic agreements will enable control of conven-
tionality to achieve the best possible application, to bring about reasonable uni-
formity in our region, and to contribute to the formation of the ius commune,
to harmonization and consistency, to the plausible and admissible definition of
the legal order and its guarantees.119 If this does not happen, the risk is that
divergences will increase, and contradictions will arise within countries—not
only between countries—and the hemispheric protection of human rights will
suffer.120
Of course, the Inter-American Court is the body authorized to resolve, defini-
tively, whether control of conventionality has been exercised correctly with re-
gard to the Inter-American system, for so long as there does not exist a superior
organ competent to review the decisions of that tribunal.121 There are stages or
“seasons” in the Inter-American jurisprudential development in regard to con-
trol.122 In the following paragraphs I will refer to the novel characteristics of
each stage, indicating also the case in which they arose, in the knowledge that
the new terms established in each case were reiterated in the subsequent jurispru-
dence, except in regard to the Gelman Case, which I will analyze separately.
Supported by the idea that the protective function of the state—and the state’s
consequent responsibility—applies to all its organs, it was understood that do-
mestic adjudicators are obligated to respect and to guarantee the observance of
IHRL, and that in this sense their natural jurisdictional function should serve
those ends and should not be limited to adjudicating violations of internal legal
norms. For that purpose, they should exercise a kind of control of convention-
ality.123
119 “Compliance control in terms of human rights assumes a cornerstone character for the devel-
opment of a common law or customary law in Latin America.” Luna Escudero & Víctor Octavio,
La nueva cultura jurídica en México: El juez nacional y los retos del control de convencionalidad
[The New Legal Culture in Mexico: The National Court and the Challenges of the Control of Con-
ventionality], in El control de convencionalidad y las cortes nacionales: La perspectiva
de los jueces mexicanos, supra note 75, at 87.
120 On the neccesity of organizing compliance control in a form that harmonizes law and the con-
struction of an ius commune, avoiding the “derailment” of this concept, see Sergio García Ramírez,
Prólogo [Foreword] to Flores Navarro & Rojas Rivera, supra note 118, at xx–xxi; see also Gar-
cía Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra note 19, at 9.
121 This has raised questions. See Becerra Ramírez, supra note 12, at 156–57.
122 Burgorgue-Larsen indicates that this concept has developed in three stages: The emergence of
the duty to control in Almonacid, the establishment of of the contours of the obligation in Dismissed
Congressional Employees, and the “theorizing” of control in Cabrera García v. Mexico. Laurence
Burgorgue-Larsen, La Erradicación de la Impunidad: Claves para Descifrar la Política Jurispruden-
cial de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [The Eradication of Impunity: Keys for De-
ciphering the Jurisprudential Policy of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights], in El Control
Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 33, 38.
123 See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006).
The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are bound to respect the rule of
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This judicial mission as guarantor of human rights—based on their national
Constitutions and on IHRL—is valuable not only to repress violations, but also
to prevent them, by “purging” state actions and thereby limiting the involvement
of the international tribunal, which would become involved less frequently, by
virtue of its being limited by the principle of subsidiarity.124 In contrast, all acts
not effectively controlled by the national judges—or by other competent inter-
nal bodies—can be the subject of cases brought before and examined by the
international tribunal.125
Accordingly, then, the Inter-American Court understood that the emerging
doctrine of control of conventionality would be exercised by national adjudica-
tors,126 in the manner in which the Inter-American Court, by its very nature
the controller of conventionality, exercised this function in the international
sphere.127 The domestic control rested in the hands, then, of the jurisdictional or-
gans, established for internal protection of rights, which for that purpose would
pay heed to international law. That seemed reasonable.
Later it was added that the national tribunals should exercise control within
their own fields of competence and in accordance with their own established
procedures128 (a reasonable addition in practical terms and unassailable in le-
law, and therefore, they are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal
system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American
Convention, its judges, as part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This
forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are
not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose
and that have not had any legal effects since their inception. In other words, the Ju-
diciary must exercise a sort of “conventionality control” between the domestic legal
provisions which are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the
treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which
is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.
Id. ¶ 124.
124 See Paolo Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,
97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38 (2003) The presence of the subsidiarity principle, well established, favored the
application of the ACHR. Of course, its effective operation involves a determination of compliance
by states, associated with the ability to ensure respect and guarantees.
125 See García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra note 19, at 46–47.
126 As in the aforementioned judgment in Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, “Judicial compliance con-
trol represents an analysis of the confrontation between internal norms and acts in regards to the
Conventional Law on Human Rights, judicially determined by competent judges, for the restoration
of the full exercise of undermined freedoms.” Gumesindo García Morelos, El control judicial di-
fuso de convencionalidad de los derechos humanos por los tribunales ordinarios en México [Diffuse
Judicial Control of Conventionality of Human Rights for the Ordinary Courts in Mexico], in El
Control Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 207; see also Castilla Juárez, supra
note 113.
127 See García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra note 19, at 42.
128 Id. It has been written that this remark about the powers and procedural regulations must be
interpreted as a way to “adjust” control. See Ferrer Mac-Gregor, supra note 110, at 147. On this
subject and, in general, on compliance control, see the reasonsed opinion of Ferrer Mac-Gregor as
judge on the Inter-American Court in the case of Cabrera García v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 220 (Nov. 26, 2010)
(Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, J. ad hoc, concurring).
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gal terms, since it is respectful of the rule of law129), governing the activities of
the courts and, in general, of all authorities. This mission would be exercised
by the adjudicator motu proprio, in the same way that the principle iura novit
curia governs the general functioning of the Court, and should not depend on
the initiative of the parties. The control function “should not be limited exclu-
sively to the statements or actions of the plaintiffs in each specific case, although
neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised, without consid-
ering other procedural and substantive criteria regarding the admissibility and
legitimacy of these types of action.”130
It bears mentioning that the scope of this last statement was not clarified by
the jurisprudence of the Court. Academic doctrine has called attention to this
statement, which recognizes the importance of satisfying certain material and
formal conditions for applying, where those conditions obtain, international and
national controls.131
129 See García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra note 19, at x–xi,
54, 65.
130 Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro) v. Peru, Prelminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, ¶ 128 (Nov. 24, 2006).
When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, the
judges are also subject to it; this obliges them to ensure that the effet util of the Con-
vention is not reduced or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions,
object and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judiciary should exercise not
only a control of constitutionality, but also of “conventionality” ex officio between
internal norms and the American Convention; evidently in the context of their respec-
tive spheres of competence and corresponding procedural regulations. This function
should not be limited exclusively to the statements or actions of the plaintiffs in each
specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised,
without considering other procedural and substantive criteria regarding the admissi-
bility and legitimacy of these types of action.
Id. (third and fourth emphases added) (footnote omitted). In regards to the jura novit curia principle,
which supports the implementation of relevant legal provisions, whether or not raised by the parties,
the Court’s position has been consistent since Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 163 (July 29, 1988).
131 This refers to the existence of possible procedural and substantive materials of admissible
origin.
We know . . . that international law provides some estimations for the initiation and
development of paths for the international protection of human rights: material and
formal conditions (related to the nature of the issue, the timing of the presentation of
the case, the jurisdiction of the court, for example), before the Commission and the
Court . . . . The requirement that these assumptions be satisfied does not imply, in a
concrete case in which they are proposed, appreciation of the existence of the alleged
violations or responsibility of one must confront them or the relevant reparation. It
only signifies—though this is not without importance and value on a case-by-case
basis, as is evident—the unfolding of the international path, through its own norms
and under the internal control of conventionality, in itself. These are associated with
observances of such provisions. After all, internal regulations can be—and should
be—flattering to the protection of fundamental rights, and therefore can and should
minimize the evaluations above, in order to avoid raising unnecessary barriers to the
protection of the individual. Under the same logic these estimations apply to the in-
ternational sphere.
García Ramírez, Control judicial de convencionalidad I, supra note 19, at 54–56.
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Shortly after these foundational judgments, it was deemed convenient to ex-
tend the exercise of control to other authorities, organs linked to the admin-
istration of justice at all levels.132 But it is necessary to take into account that
such organs linked to the administration of justice at all levels constitute a very
broad universe of public officials with diverse primary attributes and profes-
sional training,133 not only judicial secretaries, among whose functions is that
of substitution for judges (that is, the exercise of jurisdiction), but also persons
with other natural missions.
A further step was taken in the assignment of control to all public servants.134
132 Cabrera García v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, ¶ 225 (Nov. 26, 2010).
In its case law, this Court has acknowledged that domestic authorities are bound to
respect the rule of law, and therefore, they are required to apply the provisions in
force within the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty
such as the American Convention, all its institutions, including its judges, are also
bound by such agreements, which requires them to ensure that all the effects of the
provisions embodied in the Convention are not impaired by the enforcement of laws
that are contrary to its purpose and end. The Judiciary, at all levels, must exercise
ex officio a form of “conventionality control” between domestic legal provisions and
the American Convention, obviously within the framework of their respective compe-
tences and the corresponding procedural regulations. In this task, the Judiciary must
take into account not only the treaty itself, but also the interpretation thereof by the
Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.
Id. (first emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
133 I follow the distinction between auxiliary procedural functions (including the Clerk who can
act as a judge) and auxiliaries of the judicial system, that develop administrative or bureaucratic
characteristics. See Niceto Alcalá-Zamora y Castro, Panorama del derecho Mexicano: Sín-
tesis del Derecho Procesal [Panorama of Mexican Law: Summary of Procedural Law] 47
(1966).
134 SeeGelman v. Uruguay,Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)No. 221
(Feb. 24, 2011).
The bare existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the perma-
nent respect of International Law, including International Law of Human Rights,
and which has also been considered by the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The
democratic legitimacy of specific facts in a society is limited by the norms of protection
of human rights recognized in international treaties, such as the American Conven-
tion, in such a form that the existence of one true democratic regime is determined
by both its formal and substantial characteristics, and therefore, particularly in cases
of serious violations of nonrevocable norms of International Law, the protection of
human rights constitutes a impassable limit to the rule of the majority, that is, to the
forum of the “possible to be decided” by the majorities in the democratic instance,
those who should also prioritize “control of conformity with the Convention,” which
is a function and task of any public authority and not only the Judicial Branch.
Id. ¶ 239 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (second emphasis added). In regards to the alleged
control in the hands of “all the authorities of the country,” it has been written, “the authorities of
the country, all of them, cannot declare invalid general norms, nor can they cease their application
in cases they consider contrary to a human right originating from a constitutional or conventional
source.” José Ramón Cossío, Primeras implicaciones del Caso Radilla [First Implications of the
Radilla Case], in El Control de Convencionalidad, supra note 66, at 72.
[A]ll state authorities have the obligation to exercise ex officio a “control of con-
ventionality” between domestic standards and the American Convention, within the
framework of their respective spheres of competence and of the corresponding proce-
dural rules. Both the treaty and its interpretation the Inter-American Court, the final
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Certainly, all officials are obligated to comply with the provisions of the national
constitution and international treaties.135 Now, the general mission of compli-
ance is one matter, and the mission of “control” of the acts of other authorities
is another. I will refer below to the scope of this control.
By being broadened in this sense, the catalogue of “controllers”—which is
not synonymous with the totality of all officials who are required to observe
national and international norms—automatically includes the control mission of
all public servants of all ranks, specializations, and competencies, frommembers
of the public security, and even teachers and health officials, to people in the
postal service and officials in the central and decentralized public administration,
and so on. There is no doubt as to this extremely broad consequence of the
literal language used to define who has the duty of control. If one desires to
“rationalize” who has the duty, drawing specific lines, it would be necessary to
develop elaborate interpretations or candid and barely pertinent clarifications
and rectifications.
It is interesting to note that the doctrine as articulated by the Inter-American
Court in its earliest decisions was newly invoked by the President of the Court
during the Court’s extraordinary session in Mexico City in December 2013.136
arbiter of the American Convention, must be taken into account in this task.
Gelman v. Uruguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Considering
That,” ¶ 66 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 2013) (first emphasis added), http://www.corteidh.or.
cr/docs/supervisiones/gelman_20_03_13_ing.pdf. For his part, Ayala Corao considers that all
the organs of a state must exercise control of conventionality under Article 1 of the ACHR, and dis-
tinguishes the category of internal judicial control. See Ayala Corao, supra note 57, at 113.
135 The third paragraph of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution states: “All authorities, in their
jurisdictional spheres, have the obligation to promote, respect, protect and guarantee rights . . . .”
Constitutción Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] art. 1, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF], 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014.
136 See Diego García-Sayán, President, Inter-Am. Court of Human Rights, Speech at the Opening
of the Forty-Eighth Special Session of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Oct. 7, 2013),
http://vimeo.com/76435830.
The fact that the decision has been made here, in Mexico, as it has taken a greater or
lesser extent in several other countries in Latin America, that national judges acquire
a particular role in the control of conventionality is very important because this is
an aspect of Inter-American law with enormous relevance for domestic jurisdictions.
However, our obligation as a Court is also to promote these types of values and con-
cepts, and also to make a public call for caution as this is an enormously complex
issue through which the jurisprudence of this Court has been extremely careful in
phrasing and term selection, and I’ll allow myself to read a critical paragraph that the
Court has repeatedly used in judgments, that says: “judges and bodies related to the
administration of justice on all levels are obligated to exercise ex officio control of
conventionality between internal norms and the American Convention, within their
respective jurisdictions and corresponding procedural regulations.” In this manner in
the jurisprudence of the Court and in practice that is being developed in American
countries, compliance control is far from being a situation of every man for himself,
and any authority may decide not to apply a rule because the Court has emphasized
that excercising control of conventionality is essentially aimed the judiciary and, in
second place, is to be done within the framework of the respective powers of each au-
thority, as corresponding regulations establish the internal rules for the constitutional
and legislative norms of each country.
Id.
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He suggested caution that would favor a healthy limitation of the extent of the
duty of control, limiting and channeling it so that it will not overflow its proper
banks.
As we have seen, the idea of control of conventionality originally referred
to national “judicial” intervention in the examination of domestic norms. This
strictly defined the scope of control. In contrast, if the concept is deemed to apply
to the examination by any authority of a nation of any act in violation, the scope
expands without limit: All examinations of the consistency of a domestic act with
an IHRL norm would amount to control of conventionality.
Now consider how this control could be exercised andwhat would be its legal
consequences. The Inter-American Court did not order states to establish regimes
of diffuse control, although the Court would probably sympathize with such a
regime.137 The Court left the final decision to states, so long as their solution
permits judicial control of conventionality, which is the axis of the proposed
system. Given this, it would seem perfectly possible, and useful, to review the
circumstances in which control would operate and to adopt the best criteria in
light of those circumstances.
This has been recommended by various writers, who are concerned about
the effects of an almost total absence of regulation,138 as well as by the prob-
lems that could arise from divergent opinions among courts exercising control,
resulting in a breach of the principle of legal security, which is a fundamental
element of the rule of law.139 There has even been suggested a solution half
way between absolutely diffuse control and concentrated control, taking note of
regimes that could serve this end, such as the constitutional questions involving
137 Cossío, supra note 134, at 71.
The diffuse control of compliance implies that “when the judges of a country, all of
them, consider that the general rule that should apply in a lawsuit is contrary to a
human right contained in an international treaty ratified by Mexico, they must cease
the application of that provision and accordingly resolve the case.
Id.; see alsoCaballeroOchoa, supra note 52, at 80, 85 (recognizing that the Inter-American Court
“has not tried to impose [on national courts] the specifics” of the control).
138 See de Vergottini, supra note 60, at 106; Néstor Sagüés, El ‘control de convencionalidad’
como instrumento para la elaboración de un ius commune interamericano [“Control of Convention-
ality” as a Tool for the Development of an Inter-American ius commune], in La justicia constitu-
cional y su internacionalización [Constitutional Justice and its Internationalization]
451 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2010); José María Serna de la Garza, Impacto e implica-
ciones constitucionales de la globalización en el sistema jurídico mexicano [The Impact
and Constitutional Implications of Globalization in the Mexican Judicial System] 279
(2012). Since I undertook the study of compliance control in Mexico, I have emphasized that the
Inter-American Court has not ruled on the nature of that control: concentrated or diffuse. It is indis-
pensable, in my opinion, to carefully ponder the most convenient way to control an instrument of
legal harmonization, security and justice, that does not direct ius commune towards jurisprudential
dispersion, which constitutes one of the most grave risks in this area. In this order of considera-
tions, “it is perfectly possible—I might add—that the national legislative organize a consultative
regime similar to the questions of constitutionality that offer other national experiences and that
permit a unity of interpretation and favor legal security.” García Ramírez, Control judicial de
convencionalidad I, supra note 19.
139 See Albanese, supra note 111, at 25, 44.
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the procedure of Spanish law.140 In referring to what he calls the tacit and quali-
fied acceptance of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court by national
courts, one writer indicates that the inferior courts do not generally exercise
such control (of conventionality), although they do refer cases to the constitu-
tional chamber for consultation on constitutionality. Some observers see this
phenomenon as beneficial in order to avoid divergent interpretations by lower
court judges and to establish uniform criteria through the jurisprudence of the
constitutional chamber.141
It is worth reiterating that some countries in the region have a tradition of
diffuse control; others, of concentrated control, which is deeply rooted and, in
general, functions well.142 It is also worth noting that, in some states, there are
relatively few judges, while in others the number of judges is extremely large
and they have multiple specializations. One must contemplate thousands—not
merely dozens or hundreds—of judges, without experience, neither near nor re-
mote, in matters of diffuse control, exercising control over very diverse matters
in their respective trenches: civil, criminal, family, mercantile, guarantees, ad-
ministrative, agrarian, civic justice (or municipal justice of the peace), labor,
etc.143
I mentioned that each country may have particularities in regard to the imme-
diate effects of control of conventionality,144 as well as in regard to the problems
that judges may encounter in applying control. Above all, the problem that arises
140 Constitución Española [C.E.], art. 163, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 6, 1978 (Spain), translated in
George E. Glos, The New Spanish Constitution, Comments and Full Text, 7 Hastings Const. L.Q.
47, 127 (1979).
When a court of law considers a legal norm determinative of a case, but of doubtful
constitutional validity, it will submit the matter to the Constitutional Court in such
cases, in such form, and with such effect, as shall be determined by law, which may
in no event permit such decisions to be delayed.
Id.; see also Edgar Corzo Sosa, La cuestión de inconstitucionalidad [The Question of
Unconstitutionality] 171 (1998) (It is understood that the logic that presides over questions of
unconstitutionality with its effects on the subject of jurisprudential unity and legal security can be
extended, mutatis mutandis, to the control of conventionality).
141 Sagüés, supra note 107, at 431. Apart from the doctrine of the Court of the European Union
on the “covert act” and “clear act,” Fernando Silva García indicates that this latter concept permits
judicial control be made based on case law or ideal materials to sustain a rational and adequate
motivation on the part of the national judge. It does not breakwith themodel of concentrated control
because there exists jurisprudential support for setting aside national law. See Fernando Silva García,
El control judicial de la ley con base en tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos [Judicial
Control of the Law Based on International Human Rights Treaties], in El Control Difuso de
Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 455, 459–61.
142 See Sagüés, supra note 138, at 454–55.
143 On control of conventionality by national judges, see Flores Navarro & Rojas Rivera,
supra note 118, at 152; see also Pablo G. Salinas, Cumplimiento de las Resoluciones de la Corte
IDH [Compliance with the Resolutions of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.], in El control de conven-
cionalidad, supra note 66, at 231, 235; Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Los desafíos del control de
convencionalidad del corpus iuris interamericano para los tribunales nacionales, en especial, para los
tribunales constitucionales [The Challenges of the Control of Conventionality in the Inter-American
Corpus Juris for National Courts, and in particular, for Constitutional Courts], in El Control
Difuso de Convencionalidad, supra note 102, at 331, 341.
144 Recall the similar disparities regarding control of constitutionality.
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when control is established suddenly without sufficient preparation for its appli-
cation or new provisions to protect human rights implies the need for important
changes.145
It is not possible for me to refer to all countries, but I can propose the ex-
ample of my own: Mexico.146 If we refer to the examination of dispositions of
general application (laws and regulations, which were the subject that originally
motivated the enunciation of the doctrine of control) control of conventionality
then means “non-application”147 of a norm, or its “expulsion” from the do-
mestic legal order, according to the circumstances.148 How can we resolve the
145 For a critique of the “confusion” generated by the sudden entrance into force of the Mexican
constitutional reform of 2001 and its immediate applications (“the lack of a reasonable time to
prepare the judiciary on the scope of a such a complex reform has begun to take its toll”) and
the “indoctrination” to which judges have been exposed (“to break with all that has been done in
the past”), and the division between courts “in the delirious celebration that decisions to reform
everything can be made from their desktops” and judges “who do not believe that human rights
were invented in 2011,” see Francisco Javier Sandoval López, El activismo judicial o la dictadura
de los jueces: Análisis del modelo de control difuso sobre derechos fundamentales de prestación
asistencial [Judicial Activism or Judicial Dictatorship: Analysis of the Model of Diffuse Control over
Fundamental Rights of Welfare Assistance], in El control de convencionalidad y las cortes
nacionales: La perspectiva de los jueces mexicanos, supra note 75, at 200–01.
146 See Olga María del Carmen Sánchez Cordero de García Villegas, La tutela multinivel de los
derechos fundamentales ante el nuevo paradigma constitucional [Multilevel Protection of Funda-
mental Rights in the New Constitutional Paradigm], in El control de convencionalidad y las
cortes nacionales: La perspectiva de los jueces mexicanos, supra note 75, at 271 (on the
effects of the invalidity or inapplicability involving, respectively, removal of invalid norms from the
judicial system or omission in the application of an unconventional norm and the direct application
of constitutional or conventional dispositions).
147 Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano, Derechos humanos en México: ¿Un mandato de conven-
cionalidad o de constitucionalidad? [Human Rights in Mexico: A Mandate of Conventionality or
Constitutionality?], in El control de convencionalidad y las cortes nacionales: La perspec-
tiva de los jueces mexicanos, supra note 75, at 49–50 (The inapplicability of norms “does not
implicate a contrasting analysis between legal texts, but a mere comparison of principles and norms
as distinguished in constitutional text and in international treaties, in which one can detect that a
legal norm attentive to those against contrary to fundamental human rights, at which point it is then
correct to nullify the effects of such a contrary standard,” a different act than expelling it from the
legal system entirely).
148 In its analysis of Radilla-Pacheco, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice established, with
binding force for the courts, a model of control of conventionality and constitutionality that derived
from paragraph 339 of the judgment adopted by the Inter-American Court in that case, and that
established the following:
1) The judges of the Judicial Power of the Federation to have jurisdiction over con-
stitutional controversies, unconstitutional actions and constitutional protection, may
declare the invalidity of the rules that contravene the Federal Constitution or interna-
tional treaties that recognize human rights, to effect only specific cases and without
making a declaration of invalidity of the rules that contravene the Federal Constitu-
tion or international treaties that recognize human rights; 2) the other judges of the
country, in matters within their jurisdiction, may disengage those rules that infringe
on the Federal Constitution or international treaties that recognize human rights, to
effect only specific cases and without making a declaration of invalidity on the pro-
visions; and 3) The authorities of the country who do not exercise judicial functions,
must interpret human rights in a manner that most favors them, without having the
authority to declare the invalidity of the rules or disengage them in specific cases.
Varios 912/2010, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN], Semanario Judicial de la Federación
148 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
problems that would be generated by a “multiplication of non-applications and
expulsions,” if we have no legislation at hand to provide security and promote
justice?149
It is worth mentioning an incipient practice that has appeared in the use of
control of conventionality as a means to advance, as part of a deliberate strategy,
the protection of human rights in certain fields. This can be especially important
in cases involving members of vulnerable groups for whom the judges make
efforts to extend the benefits of fairness.150
The idea of direct application of international norms and judgments by do-
mestic courts is not out of place, to be sure, in the European jurisdictional system
for the protection of human rights. Under a “principle of solidarity,” the Euro-
pean Court would see its pronouncements applied in states that were not litigants
in the case before the Court in which the pronouncement was made.151 The Eu-
ropean Court has noted, “that although the existence of a remedy is necessary, it
is not in itself sufficient. The domestic courts must be able, under domestic law,
to apply the European case-law directly and their knowledge of this case-law
has to be facilitated by the state in question.”152
XII Reparations
I should not extend myself further in this article. I will allude only to a major
aspect of the implications of Inter-American jurisdiction over national systems.
I refer to the noteworthy contributions of the Inter-American Court on the sub-
ject of reparations. In the opinion of many, this constitutes its most significant
y su Gaceta, Novena Época, libro I, tomo 1, Octubre de 2011, Página 313, 366 (Mex.).
149 It is necessary that the legislature clarify “situations that may generate uncertainty in judicial
tasks such as, the accountability of judges, the role of national and international jurisprudence, the
definition of the concept of ‘relative norms of human rights,’ the mechanisms for adopting judgments
dictated in international circumstances, the reaches of the principle of pro homine, among others.”
Alberto Miguel Ruiz Matías & César Alejandro Ruiz Jiménez, El principio pro homine en el sistema
jurídico mexicano [The Pro Homine Principal in the Mexican Judicial System], in El control de
convencionalidad y las cortes nacionales: La perspectiva de los jueces mexicanos, supra
note 75, at 142.
150 See Control de convencionalidad para el logro de la igualidad [Control of Com-
pliance to Achieve Equality] (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Voces sobre Justicia y
Género Ser. No. 3, 2012). This work forms part of a series that promotes the introduction of “gender
perspective in judging.” Juan Silva Meza, Prólogo [Prologue] to Control de convencionalidad
para el logro de la igualidad, supra, at ix.
151 See Eur. Parl. Ass., Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 4th
Part-Sess., Doc. No. 8808 (2000).
The principle of solidarity implies that the case-law of the Court forms part of the
Convention, thus extending the legally binding force of the Convention erga omnes
(to all the other parties). This means that the states parties not only have to execute
the judgments of the Court pronounced in cases to which they are party, but also have
to take into consideration the possible implications which judgments pronounced in
other cases may have for their own legal system and legal practice.
Id. ¶ 3.
152 Mostacciuolo v. Italy (No. 2), App. No. 65102/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 125 (2006), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72936; see also Albanese, supra note 111, at 22.
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and original contribution to the international regime of human rights.153 From
the outset of drafting the American Convention, our region generated innova-
tions in the field of reparations, as can be observed in the history of the current
Article 63(1) of the Pact of San José,154 and in the criteria established by the
Inter-American Court.155
The Latin American orientation toward this topic favored the structural char-
acter of reparations, without losing their traditional role in compensating victims
for damages suffered. What has been sought by Inter-American jurisprudence—
as can be seen by comparing it to its European counterpart—is to act not only on
the individual factors, but the general factors leading to human rights violations.
The Court’s generous orientation implies very profound, energetic and com-
plex actions by states, and frequently provokes resistance that goes beyond mere
reticence. In order to bring reality up to the demands of IHRL, these actions re-
quire a combination of will and resources, which are usually similar or identical
to those enunciated by the national constitutions, which are often not respected
in practice.
XIII Appendix of Conclusions on Control of Conventionality
I deem it useful to include as an appendix to this work the text, which appears
(as a summary of the doctrine of the Inter-American Court on judicial control of
conventionality) in a recent publication of which I am co-author. Beginning with
the following paragraph, I transcribe that text literally. The reference to national
courts refers to those of the Mexican judicial system. The summary of the topic
thus permits one to observe the existence of:
a) Control of conventionality in order to establish the conformity
of a national norm (without regard to its character) with an
international norm.
b) Control of its own, whether original or external, of conven-
tionality by the supranational tribunal called upon to compare
domestic acts with conventional provisions. Without a doubt,
the exercise of this control is incumbent on the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, specifically in cases before it and how
it applies norms consistent with its subject matter jurisdiction.
153 See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights 289 (2003); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights
Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 Colum. J. Transnat’l L.
351, 355 (2008).
154 See García Ramírez & del Toro Huerta, supra note 1, at 72, 138, 271.
155 SeeDinah Shelton, International Institutions and Tribunals, inRemedies in International
Human Rights Law 137, 172 (1999); Faúndez Ledesma, supra note 25, at 778; Héctor Faún-
dez Ledesma, Reparaciones e indemnizaciones en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos
[Reparations and Compensation under the American Convention of Human Rights], Rev. de la
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas [J. Fac. Legal & Pol. Sci.], no. 103, 1997, at 17
(Universidad Central de Venezuela) (Venez.).
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c) Control by domestic judicial organs (or rather, more broadly,
jurisdictional organs, even though the original expression of the
Inter-American Court would appear to be restricted to organs
of the Judicial Power), and not by administrative organs, which
also should observe the international norms of human rights,
but this observance has another source (Article 1 of the Consti-
tution), which is different from judicial control of convention-
ality.
On this point it is necessary to take into account that in re-
cent judgments the Inter-American Court has referred to con-
trol of conventionality as a function of “the judges and organs
linked to the administration of justice at all levels,” an expres-
sion which seems to considerably extend the field of application
of this function. In addition, the same tribunal has established
that control of confidentiality “is a function and task of any
public authority and not only of the Judicial Power,” reiterat-
ing that the idea of the state as the principal guarantor of the
human rights of persons has “taken form in recent jurispru-
dence under the conception that all the authorities and organs
of a State Party to the Convention have the obligation to ex-
ercise control of conventionality.” (emphasis added). It will be
necessary to reflect on the correct interpretation of such broad
statements—which raise doubts—in a form, which permits con-
trol to operate well.
d) Control subject to the criteria of the supranational tribu-
nal, which is supposed to interpret and apply the treaty that
guides the control, except—obviously—when the supranation-
al tribunal has not rendered an interpretation on the point at
issue (in which case, the domestic court will render its own in-
terpretation of the treaty).
When the national court deploys control of conventionality in
the absence of a supranational interpretation, its decisions do
not attain the character of erga omnes. In other words, it may
fix provisional criteria, inter partes, who are subject to immedi-
ate national control, as might occur, for example, through the
resolution of conflicts of criteria among the chambers of the
[Mexican] National Supreme Court of Justice, Circuit plenar-
ies or collegial tribunals (or through a system of “questions of
unconstitutionality,” which constitutes an alternative to bear
in mind, as we shall see below) and always subject to suprana-
tional definitions. In any case, control of conventionality car-
ried out in the domestic sphere is always subject to the possi-
bility of verification on the part of the Inter-American Court.
e) Control favorable to the highest level of protection of the indi-
vidual. The national tribunals may adopt interpretations more
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favorable to the protection of the individual than those estab-
lished by the supranational tribunal, thereby broadening of the
extent of rights and liberties, by means of an interpretation
pro persona or pro homine. It is understood that the tribunals
that proceed in this manner would be interpreting precisely the
norms that they should apply.
As has already been said, the interpretations of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court can be superseded by acts—international instru-
ments, national provisions, acts of domestic jurisprudence—
that recognize greater rights for persons. This conclusion,
which derives immediately from the principle pro persona or
pro homine, is supported by the norms of interpretation con-
tained in Article 29 of the American Convention.
f) Control exercised on its own initiative, motu proprio, by the
organ that carries out this function, without the necessity of a
demand or request by the party to the proceeding, which brings
into play, as well, the principle of jura novit curia and the sup-
plementing of the complaint (for omission or deficiency).
g) Control exercised within the field of competence of the organ
which carries it out (and which therefore must be authorized
to carry out this mission: thereby respecting the principle of
legality in regard to the specific attributes of the adjudicator).
h) Control exercised in conformity with the procedural regula-
tions (which should be foreseen, for this purpose, in the law:
thereby respecting the principle of legality in regards to proce-
dure). In this same sphere of procedural legality, it is necessary
to respect the formal and material conditions of admissibility
and applicability of the actions by which control is exercised.
i) Control subject to guidelines that make it consistent with the
general interpretation appropriate to the examination of ques-
tions that come before the controlling body, and which favor
the gradual adoption of a jus commune.156
156 García Ramírez & Morales Sánchez, supra note 66, at 300–02.
152 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
